Bull's eye said:
Sorry, the first shermans entered eastern scenario in late 1942.
No need to be sorry. But perhaps you can provide some more detailed information? Any sources you can note for us?
My information is that the Soviets tested but rejected gasoline-powered Shermans, taking none into active service. The first M4A2 (diesel engined) Shermans arrived in the spring of 1943, just prior to Kursk. However, I have seen no indication that any Sherman-equipped formation participated in the Kursk action. There are clear records of M3A1 Stuart, M3 Lee and Churchill Mk3 formations participating in the Kursk battles, and I presume there were multiple Valentine formations as well (though I have no details at the moment). But I have never seen a reference of Shermans in action with the Soviets before the race to the Donets after Kursk.
And retreat as an argument , that germans didn´t use captured land lease shermans ? They used jeeps and studebakers and some more allied types captured from the russians at any time.
I don't mean to suggest that the Germans would not use captured equipment when and if it was available. Certainly, if it was captured in running (or nearly running) condition, it would have been used. The question is whether and when they would have been captured.
The main reason perhaps was, like with all of the russian churchills, shermans, grants : one direct hit one explosion five dead tankers. Russian tankers didn´t like the allied tanks because of their thin armor. It was a necessity, after the heavy tank tank losses, to use allied material,nothing else.
I don't know what sources have lead you to develop this view, but without meaning to sound too judgemental I think it is not a "well informed" perspective.
Statistics show, quite contrary to popular literature, that the Sherman had excellent crew survivability. Survival rates in US service were such that more Sherman crewmen were killed outside of their tanks than inside, quite regardless of popular talk of "ronsons". The average casualty rates were just a bit more than one dead, and one to two wounded, per Sherman that was completely destroyed.
Soviet statistics indicate a far higher survival rate for Sherman crews than for T-34 crews once the armor had been penetrated. The statistics I have seen indicate an average of just more than one
surviving crew member per T-34 that was completely destroyed.
Have you ever tried to get into or out of a T-34's driver or co-driver seats? I have. I can hardly imagine having to get out in an emergency.
As to "thin armor" ... well there are many aspects to consider in comparing the protection levels of a Sherman versus its Soviet counterpart the T-34.
First, one should note that the frontal armor on a Sherman was thicker than the frontal armor on a T-34. Always was. On every sub-variant that the Soviets ever saw. However, the sloping was not as good. So the protection level, particularly over most of the front slope, was not as good against German high-velocity AT guns. But it was better against large-caliber HE and HEAT rounds (such as artillery and infantry AT weapons) . Once the M34A1 mantlet appeared the Sherman had better frontal armor on the turret. The shape of the T-34 turret had a well developed ability to deflect rounds to the side (much of the frontal profile area is actually the side of the turret at a very sharp angle) which gave a boost to protection from shots hitting the turret from the frontal aspect, but also made a larger target without added side-away sloping when firing on the turret from the side aspect.
Also, US rolled or cast plate was not as brittle as Soviet armor, so a hit which did damage to the tank (full penetration, partial penetration, or over-match with interior spalling) did not cause as much harm inside the fighting compartment. Soviet armor plate was of higher hardness, and lower ductility, than any other nation's homogenous plate, to the point where it can be viewed as a sort of "all or nothing" design philosophy. It had a better ability to deflect a projectile, but if the armor was not sufficient for a full "bounce off", then it tended to shatter, and the armor itself became as much of a danger to the crew as the projectile.
The Soviets took many tanks from British, Canadian, and US sources. They took almost any tanks they could get in 1941 and 1942. They took Mathildas, Mk VIs, M3 Grants and Lees, Churchills, even Tetrarchs. But that stopped by the middle of 1943. They no longer accepted Mathildas, nor Churchills, nor Lees. They were no longer short of tanks, and so they rejected the tanks that didn't serve them well. But they not only accepted, but requested, more Valentines and Shermans. They found these tanks to be usefull. More than 4,000 Sherman M4A2s were accepted into Soviet service AFTER Kursk. AFTER the Soviets had ascended to the level that they outnumbered the Axis armor by more than 2-to-1 on all fronts. AFTER the Soviets were fielding the largest tank force in the world.
So suggesting that the only reason they took Shermans was because "It was a necessity, after the heavy tank tank losses, to use allied material,nothing else" does not appear to be justified by the facts.
And after production of the Many T34, even T34/85 had been used by the germans f.e as recovery vehicles, even after 1943.
Why would the Germans use a T-34/85 as a recovery vehicle? It was a first rate combat tank.
retreat is not the reason ( remember, that the germans did use many captured shermans and other vehicles at the normandy front; and there has been reatreat retreat retreat all the time ). But sometimes counter attacks had been very successfull ( Charkow f.e )and everything that runs was used immediatly
The Germans did not use many captured Shermans at the Normandy front.
They used many captured Hotchkiss chassis, and Char-Bs. These had been captured by the Germans in 1940, when they were advancing against the French.
Shermans were rare in German service.
"Everything that runs was used immediately" does not explain the use of captured tanks. Warfare is not like a video game. You don't find unmanned but fully functional tanks just sitting around on the battlefield, and infantrymen don't just run up, jump into an empty tank, and drive it away to fight.
Local counter-attacks do not tend to net large quantities of usable tanks. Tanks are generally abandoned for a reason, such as ... they aren't runners at the moment that the forces have to run. Since tanks are highly valued fighting vehicles, if they are in working condition they tend to be used in the fighting, even when a unit is loosing. A local counter-attack seldom holds the ground long enough, nor has the excess resources, for recovery and repair of large, heavy, non-functional enemy fighting equipment. It is hard enough to recover your own stuff.
However large operational-scale offensives (or counter-offensives) often capture quantities of enemy equipment, including tanks. Depots and repair facilities can get overrun, and as the front continues to advance, rear-area support echelons come to occupy these areas and have the time to effect recovery and/or repairs.
Jeeps and truck, on the other had, are often grabbed in small quantities when local HQs are overrun or encircled in tactical actions. An encircled HQ element is likely to leave their jeeps and trucks behind while it tries to defend itself or fight its way out. They are easy war booty, compared to tanks.
Most trucks and jeeps will run for months with fuel and oil. Tanks will run for a couple of days at most before maintenance is required. If you don't have a reasonably well developed ability to supply parts and materials for a tank, it won't run more than a few hundred Kms. The best you can do is make it a pillbox.
It is true that German formations occasionally managed to put captured tanks into service against the Soviets on a local basis. But that was the exception rather than the rule.
The Germans, as the Soviets, had a pretty well developed and CENTRALIZED process for collecting, sorting, modifying (when appropriate) and re-issuing captured equipment. Regulations called for captured enemy equipment to be turned over to higher command for submittal to a collection point. Tanks that were not in very good condition were scavanged for spare parts to be issued to units that had received the tanks that were in good running condition. Thus, a T-34 in German service on the front lines could be supported, rather than abandoned when the first trackpin broke. The T-34s, for example, often received a commander's cupola (deemed a necessity by German tankers) and side-skirts (as much to change the vehicles appearance and reduce fratricide as for any other reason). This was a fairly well organized activity.
It was because of this centralization that you saw German forces using Universal (Bren) Carriers on the Eastern Front, or Soviet 76mm guns (Pak 36(r)) in the western desert.
The US Army had no such system. Some units captured enemy tanks, and kept them in service as "hacks", scavenging spare parts from battlefield wrecks as they went. So you saw one or two Panthers in service with some divisions. But nothing like the scale of German or Soviet use of captured equipment.
I have never seen, nor do I expect to find, Shermans in common usage by the Germans on the Eastern Front. One or two, running for a few days, in an isolated instance? Sure, could be. I'd be interested to read of it if anyone finds such a case. But regularly, even reflected on the unit readiness reports, as was done with captured T-34s? No, I've not seen it, nor do I expect it.