Republic of Dalmatia Imagi-Nation

[MechCommander]

The NC Cruiser Nunavut has caught up with your Carrier Battlegroup here in the Mediterranean while on our way out.

[MechCommander]

ROD we got reports that one of your Carrier Battle Groups is near NC waters. please state your buinesses?

[MechCommander]

ROD has there been any activity at the EE security zone since HMCS Nunavut left the area?

[redleg]

No

[MechCommander]

Dang still no action from the EE yet. But heres hoping.

[chrisswim]

quote=MechCommander post_id=85558 time=1653108580 user_id=167871]
Dang still no action from the EE yet. But heres hoping.
[/quote]

Mech, just keep posting as you do.
Another idea, start your own special operation or war.

[redleg]

This afternoon at Warlord Barracks in the ROD, a ceremony was held in front of the 2nd Brigade headquarters to present a battle streamer to the Dagger Brigade for recent combat operations in Iraq. The Minister of Defense, the Honorable Magnus McHammerhands, personally affixed the streamer to the brigade colors as the division commander, corps commander, and other dignitaries looked on.

The streamer was presented to 2nd Brigade alone, and not to the entire division, because the 2nd Brigade Combat Team was the only ROD unit to see action. The Western Iraq 2022 streamer joins the Suez War 2021 streamer on the Dagger Brigade colors. The brigade also has a Combat Unit Citation for El-Qantaro.

Similar streamers have been prepared for the CoC, RPNW, and New Canada. The ROD has no authority to present battle streamers to units of those nations, but the streamers are a symbolic gesture to recognize that there were 4 brigades in combat in Western Iraq from 4 different nations.

[chrisswim]

Wonderful that you are thinking of your Allies. Remember keep your friends closer, need to keep an eye on them!
Thank you.

[redleg]

The ROD learned many valuable lessons during this most recent war against the EE. Some of these lessons will result in organizational changes in the ROD armed forces, and some will drive changes to doctrine and operational practices. We are sharing them here in the hopes that our allies may benefit from some of these hard-learned lessons.

Lessons learned will be presented in 5 categories: national / strategic, land operations, air operations, naval operations, and enemy forces.

National / Strategic Lessons Learned
1. The ROD is spread too thin. At the beginning of the war the ROD was fighting in 3 different theaters. The Army had 5 divisions to field, so it could not mass more than a few divisions in any theater at one time. The ROD possessed significant combat power, but it was diluted by trying to cover the entire globe.

Naval and air forces were affected in a similar way. Naval forces in particular were spread out. Some of this was due to deployments to multiple theaters, but some was due to carrier battle groups chasing enemy ship activity. It wasn’t until later in the war that the ROD Navy assembled a large fleet consisting of multiple battle groups that focused on a specific mission.

Strategic mobility and the allocation of replacements was also affected by the dispersion of ROD forces. As new troops were trained and new equipment produced, the units were allocated to a specific theater based on the most immediate need and it was impossible to create a steady flow of troops into a particular area of operations. Furthermore, strategic transport was limited. Air transport has some inherent flexibility, but sealift assets are slower, require significant turnaround time, and are more vulnerable to enemy interdiction.

2. Coalition nations lacked a single unified headquarters. ROD and POP forces in Syria and Turkey held a few meetings to discuss war strategy, but a unified command structure was never established. This made it impossible to effectively coordinate combat operations between coalition partners.

3. The ROD did not have a national-level headquarters for the overall war effort. The Ministry of Defense allocated resources to the theater commanders, but some opportunities were missed for resources to be used in multiple theaters. An overall headquarters could have managed assets like strategic bombers, aerial tankers, reconnaissance aircraft, special operations troops, and submarines more effectively.

[panzergator]

Good lessons, but you knew this stuff already. Principles of War. Concentration of forces to achieve critical objectives. Unity of command! All this is a good reason for coalition warfare for democracies.

Thou shalt not piecemeal thy tanks (or thy divisions).
He who defends (or attacks) everything defends (or attacks) nothing.

Sometimes, we forget the stuff we do for real is just important in a wargame.

Organize the effort.
1. Define the mission.
2. Determine the tasks and resources required vs available. Adjust the mission, tasks in accordance with the resources available.
3. Allocate the tasks and resources.
4. Issue the order and follow the preparation.
5. Execute and adjust as the situation develops.

All blessings flow from a good mission statement (and its following 5-paragraph field order).

[MechCommander]

The Pan Oceanic Pact has learned quite well during this War to Redleg and Panzer and they have highlighted their own reforms for future conflicts. More reforms will follow in the coming months.

1. The Establishment of a Mechanized Infantry Brigade and a Tank Brigade for the Corps HQ to be used as on field reinforcements in case the main Pact member nations Divisions have troubles clearing out enemy positions.

2. The NCAF Infantry Brigade Groups will be equipped with the Stryker MGS's to provide much needed direct fire support in future engagements.

3. The NC Army will have a Army Air unit but their aircraft will be limited to small prop driven Aircraft, pending on what the RCAF has in stock to give them.

4. to ensure that the POP can provide the best security for the Bosporus and the Suez from future EE attacks. POP overseas base will be established in Italy, Cyprus, and Yemen to ensure that both waterways will be kept safe. NC will continue to use their 2 overseas bases in Germany. And a naval station in Cyprus.

5. the Felines Royal Artillery units will now be equipped with the PzH 2000 for longer range.

6. Despite being late for combat in this War, the RCNs next gen fighter will be the CF-118 Super Hornet. the CF-14s will remain in service for a little longer until a next gen replacement can be found.

7. Improving our Sub hunting capabilities.

8. and lastly improving on our formations when ground forces travel.

[chrisswim]

The ROD learned many valuable lessons during this most recent war against the EE. Some of these lessons will result in organizational changes in the ROD armed forces, and some will drive changes to doctrine and operational practices. We are sharing them here in the hopes that our allies may benefit from some of these hard-learned lessons.

Lessons learned will be presented in 5 categories: national / strategic, land operations, air operations, naval operations, and enemy forces.

National / Strategic Lessons Learned
1. The ROD is spread too thin. At the beginning of the war the ROD was fighting in 3 different theaters. The Army had 5 divisions to field, so it could not mass more than a few divisions in any theater at one time. The ROD possessed significant combat power, but it was diluted by trying to cover the entire globe.

Naval and air forces were affected in a similar way. Naval forces in particular were spread out. Some of this was due to deployments to multiple theaters, but some was due to carrier battle groups chasing enemy ship activity. It wasn’t until later in the war that the ROD Navy assembled a large fleet consisting of multiple battle groups that focused on a specific mission.

Strategic mobility and the allocation of replacements was also affected by the dispersion of ROD forces. As new troops were trained and new equipment produced, the units were allocated to a specific theater based on the most immediate need and it was impossible to create a steady flow of troops into a particular area of operations. Furthermore, strategic transport was limited. Air transport has some inherent flexibility, but sealift assets are slower, require significant turnaround time, and are more vulnerable to enemy interdiction.

2. Coalition nations lacked a single unified headquarters. ROD and POP forces in Syria and Turkey held a few meetings to discuss war strategy, but a unified command structure was never established. This made it impossible to effectively coordinate combat operations between coalition partners.

3. The ROD did not have a national-level headquarters for the overall war effort. The Ministry of Defense allocated resources to the theater commanders, but some opportunities were missed for resources to be used in multiple theaters. An overall headquarters could have managed assets like strategic bombers, aerial tankers, reconnaissance aircraft, special operations troops, and submarines more effectively.

Thank you for sharing. Great perspective.

Good lessons, but you knew this stuff already. Principles of War. Concentration of forces to achieve critical objectives. Unity of command! All this is a good reason for coalition warfare for democracies.

Thou shalt not piecemeal thy tanks (or thy divisions).
He who defends (or attacks) everything defends (or attacks) nothing.

Sometimes, we forget the stuff we do for real is just important in a wargame.

Organize the effort.
1. Define the mission.
2. Determine the tasks and resources required vs available. Adjust the mission, tasks in accordance with the resources available.
3. Allocate the tasks and resources.
4. Issue the order and follow the preparation.
5. Execute and adjust as the situation develops.

All blessings flow from a good mission statement (and its following 5-paragraph field order).

Thank you.

[redleg]

You're right PG - I should have known better going into this war. Just wait til you see the dumb mistakes I made at the tactical and operational level! I got complacent with moving icons around on a map, and I got a little too cocky at times in thinking I could out-maneuver the EE whenever I wanted to. Sometimes the dice don't go your way!

[MechCommander]

I think the POP faired better in this war. As we fought tooth and nail to take Aleppo. And of course the way we dealt with the EE units in Konya.

[redleg]

The POP did perform much better in this war. We both still have a long way to go to become tactical and operational geniuses though! We will keep working on it.