US/UK vs USSR in the aftermath of WWII

[1ComOpsCtr]

There are several interesting threads contained within the posts on this topic, and when you combine them with other posted topics an interesting picture appears...

Think about Soviet command and control and the lack of radio communications at the platoon/company level. Compare that with US and UK usage. Compare levels of education and comprehension of radio communication in general.

Consider the almost "Human Wave" attacks made by troops that weren't internally motivated, but rather externally motivated by threat or coercion. Yes, they all got better with time and experience, but do you think that was for the same reasons. How did education play a part in that factor? Did soldiers on either side fight with the same level of enthusiasm?

How long could the Soviet Union keep up the "overwhelm" tactics with their armor... (fanatics vs few men with magazine rifles)?

What about tactical level commanders? Did the individuals at the sharp end of the stick have the ability to make decisions in a way(other than pulling the trigger or running this way of that) that could really make a difference? Was there any bottom up decision-making possible?

I don't think the US would have hesitated to use Nukes against the Russians, and I also believe we (the human race) would have paid a very heavy price for such decisions primarily because we did not fully realize the potential consequences of such weapon usage until many years later...

I believe today we would still have "unsafe" zones where Moscow once was, as well as where major production areas, and the Soviet oil fields were... but I also believe we would not have had Korea, Viet Nam, or the Gulf Wars if there had been a showdown with the Soviets before 1950...

The Soviet Leadership had a paranoia that was unrivaled. That paranoia would have been their unraveling then just as it was in 1989, only it would have been much more expensive in the terms of lives lost if what happened in 1989 had occurred in 1949, brought about through use of force.

Will
ComOpsCtr

[tstockton]

Will,

Overall, I agree with your assessments. However, there is another thought to consider here -- the Chinese. Who "controls" China -- Mao Tse-Tung or Chiang Kai-Shek? Is the answer to that dependant upon the year, or more so on how much one faction or the other receives the support of either the USSR or the USA?

Although it was not in the original "seed" of this thread... I think in the "big" view, you have to factor in the most populous nation in the world!

Another two cents worth... maybe three!

Regards,
Tom

[av8rmongo]

Tom,

I agree on China. AndI guess in my reconstruction of the past we would have poured into China as a back door to the Soviet Union which would have spelled disaster for Mao but as Will points out would have avoided Korea later.

Paul

[1ComOpsCtr]

Tom,

I did not forget the largest potential army on the face of the earth. I included them on our side, primarily because of our help defeating the Japanese. If Mao gets control after the confrontation with the Soviets we will pay a price, ...but perhaps that won't happen if an all out war breaks out between the Soviets and the Chinese due to the potential brutality and huge loss of life after one "human wave" army goes up against another "human wave" army... The potential loss of life would have been staggering, and largely unknown by the rest of the world.

What is really interesting in my view, is to think about what would have happened in the middle east, without the rivalry between the Soviets and the Allies.

Will
ComOpsCtr

[Mk 1]

Our esteamed colleague av8rmongo noted:

... the Soviets of 45-46 ... were hopelessly outclassed at the truly Strategic level of war.

I might go a little deaper into the definition there. They were truly outclassed on several levels... on the level of "Global Strategy", on the level of "Multi-Service Combined Arms Operations", and on the level of "Industrial/Economic Might".

In the long run, their only chance for victory would be a lack of resolve on the part of the US. Not that there isn't a real possibility there, but it is not a military question. If the theoretical war continued on after the short term of three or four major offensive operations, things would start to go bad for them.

(Oh, and BTW, that's about what happened to the Japanese and the Germans too.)

With Japan defeated (or at a minimum contained) those soldiers, sailors, ships and airplanes would be a second front for the Soviets to contend with.

Allied with China, and operating from bases there or Korea or the Aleutians or even Japan itself, we would have a golden opportunity to penetrate the eastern provinces and sever the supplies of mineral resources found there. At a minimum the Soviets would have to respond to the incursion. ...

I am not so sure they would have to respond. Why?

The Soviet Union of 1945 took almost NO resources out of Eastern Siberia, except for use along their own Pacific coast.

Their great industrial centers were located along the Ural mountains. Check a map, and you will find that those are not at all threatened by any reasonable ground operations on the Soviet western borders.

There was all of a single (as in: one) rail line running east of Lake Baikal. The trans-Siberian railway was not even double-tracked! You can't move enough resources to make a difference at the level of a national economy over a single rail line, even if that line didn't need to also carry passenger service (which it did, in large numbers). In short, the resources of Eastern Siberia were irrelevant.

The Soviets had a tendancy to respond aggressively to incursions into their Eastern domains -- sometimes. At their own choosing. Whether, and when. They did tend to respond, but they didn't have to. They could have ignored almost anything. If you read the U.S. War College study on the campaign at Nomonhan (which the Soviets called Kalkin Ghol), it becomes clear that they were perfectly willing to sit back and wait until the time and circumstances were ripe for their own riposte.

And the truth is the Soviets in the East were not the same caliber as those in Europe - never have been from the time of Peter the Great on. While the story on the Allied side is much different. The troops are seasoned, they have had four years to practice supplying large ground forces over long disatnces - the difference now is that the Soviets would have no real possibility of interdicting that flow of material.

This issue very much depends on your assumptions. The 6th Guards Tank Army that swarmed over Manchuria in August of 1945 was the most powerful single armored formation the Soviets had ever assembled to that point, and its campaign was a nearly perfect demonstration of the Soviet "theories" of mechanized maneuver in practice.

And they were lavishly equipped with the most advanced equipment -- T-34/85s, M4A2(w)(76)s, SU-100s, JS-II and IIIs, Tu-2s, IL-10s, Yak-3Us.

But would they have been there, in the event of hostilities with the West? That is a question only of how the scenario is set up.

Other quibbles:

The B-29 was not sent to Europe because it was designed for the range requirements of the war in the Pacific not because the UK couldn't handle it. There was no need for it in Erope ATT, the B-24's, B-17s, Lancasters etc. were sufficient. If they wanted to operate it in Europe it would be easy.

Are you sure of your information?

My own reading has always been that the B-29 was developed specifically and explicitly for the war in Europe. It was designed to bomb Germany, nothing more or less. The B-17 was not designed to bomb Germany, nor to participate in any other strategic bombardment compaign. At least not at the outset. Rather, it was designed to protect the US coasts, by ranging far and wide over the oceans and bombing enemy fleets into oblivion. It was pretty much just a happy coincidence (well, happy for us, that is) that it turned out to be usefull in a strategic bombing campaign against Germany.

A demonstration flight of B-29s were sent to England very early in that bomber's life. They were not used in combat, and B-29 wings were not deployed to Europe, for the most part because they found it would have been very expensive in time and resources to put the required infrastructure into place, and as you note, by then the B-17s and -24s were doing the job anyways.

Operations in the Pacific show just how quickly an spot of ground can be made ready to handle aircraft. Any airfield that can operate B-24s and B-17s can be made ready for B-29s in 24-48 hrs as far as the runways, taxiways and aprons are concerned.

A fully loaded B-29 placed several times more weight per sq. in. on its wheels than either of the earlier birds. Runways needed to be re-inforced or re-built to new standards, not just lengthened. And the lengthening was pretty significant. About 2x for fully fueled and bombed-up B-29s.

Pouring concrete is easy and quick. Getting enough concrete to where you need it, along with all the personnel equipment to make proper use of it, takes time.

And its not just a matter of concrete. All of the repair and fitting-out facilities were different for a B-29. Hangers needed to be substantially larger. The skin was of a wholly new/different technology (remember that the B-29 was pressurized at high altitude, the -17 and -24 were not), and needed facilities for repair and maintenance. And the plane carried about 4x the bomb load of a B-17 over distance, meaning that sustained operations required substantially expanded bunkerage. Small items, each in themselves. But doing it all, 5,000 or 6,000 miles away from where you were planning on doing any of it, takes time to organize, support, and implement.

It wouldn't have taken anything like 3 or 4 months for supplies or even 3 or 4 months to build an airfield.

A tank, or an airplane, or a round of ammunition, built in a factory in September of 1944, would, on average, arrive at a front line unit in February of 1945.

That is with the whole infrastructure in place, built-up painstakingly over a period of 3 years.

Sure, small lots or special-needs items could be rushed to the front in a matter of a few weeks. Even a few days. But if you want to conduct a meaningful campaign, you need more than one item for "show-and-tell".

The US was a LONG way from any of the action. The US factories were often a LONG way from the shipping ports. There was not often a boat, sitting at the dock, just waiting to load that one item you wanted before setting course directly to the closest port to your destination. More often items accumulated at harbors for 3 to 5 weeks before being loaded, and then ships accumulated for 2 to 3 weeks before a convoy was assembled to sail to any particular port. And most sailed to only a few major ports, where the materials were AGAIN accumulated at the harbor for a smaller "local" convoy to the port of destination, where the materials were again accumulated in depots before being transported and issued to the units that needed them.

Logistics should not be thought of as an "event", but as a flow. From the US heartland to any location across the oceans was a flow of several months. It was in 1944, it would have been in 1946, as it was again in 1990.

The US knew how to do this better than any other nation in the world in 1945. But the US still could not just waive a magic wand and have needed materials appear 6,000 miles away. At least, not a LOT of materials.

The key is multiple fronts, multiple axes of approach and a continuous stream of supplies.

And time.

I agree that the key is multiple fronts and axes, and a continuous stream of supplies. That captures very succinctly what the US could do better than anyone else, and could do MUCH better than the Soviets. But it would still have taken time. Time to figure out what to do. Time to set it all up. And then time to do it.

Maybe it wouldn't have been 12 months. Maybe only 6 or 8. Maybe 16 or 18. I don't know. It would have depended as much on the clarity of thought and determination of those involved, as any count of weight-of-stores or speed-of-ships. And that human factor is not knowable in a what-if scenario. As much as we have studied and ** CENSORED ** every move of the great generals of the period, few studies have been done of the petty beaurocrats who would have made the real difference.

Or so I think. Could be wrong. Its happened before, you know.

[DrBig]

for the record, no JSIII's were used against Japan. They weren't even fit for action until the early 50's

[Mickel]

One thing to remember about convoying is that it's a defensive measure. There would have been little need for it if the G-I-UK gap remained closed, as I would expect it to have. So the transfer of supplies across the Atlantic would have been smoother and a little quicker since there would be none of this speed-of-the-slowest-ship thing to worry about. Or zig-zagging for that matter. Turn-around in the ports at both ends would have been faster as there wouldn't have been forty or fifty (or sixty or seventy) ships to handle at once.

I suspect if B-29s could be operated from atolls in the middle of the ocean they could be more easily operated from a friendly country - even if not from the grass strips the 8th Air Force and Bomber Command had. Yes, it would have taken time, but not more than a few weeks?

Another thing I was considering was what would be the end game? There are probably more answers than there are people discussing this, and it would depend on the reason for it starting (if there was one). In the previous 150 years two substantial and skilled armies had tried to reach Moscow and failed. You'd have to feel for the Poles, getting run over a third time in a decade. I don't imagine there would be an "Unconditional Surrender" either way. But this is getting a little beyond the scope of the discussion.

[thetourist]

I've been reading through the article linked through this discussiona nd one thing that really caught my eye was the fact that the Red Army occupied Iran. They would have caused enormous problems in the region and put a strain on the worlds oil supply. At least in the short term.

While it's true that the Soviets could not have threatened the sea lanes, and the supply of US goods heading to either the ETO or PTO, they could have put a strangle hold on some of the resources flowing back to the US and UK for use in their industry.

[jb]

...All speculation,to the extreme. What I suggest is setup a wargame and find out...

[tstockton]

Will,

I did not forget the largest potential army on the face of the earth. I included them on our side, primarily because of our help defeating the Japanese.

I didn't figure you had overlooked them; one thing I've noted from most of your posts is your thoroughness, looking at all angles of a given problem. However, I do not recall you mentioning them... which is why I brought the Chinese up.

I must admit, my knowledge of the Chinese is rather sketchy... I know that Mao basicially "ousted" Kai-Shek circa 1949, and am aware of references to the "Long March" -- but know very little otherwise. This lack of knowledge suggests that I need to do some "digging" and learn a few things...

Given the overall tone of this thread, I would imagine that where and how the Chinese would be involved -- or not, if they were engaged in their own "civil war" -- and how they would have affected a potential "The Allies" vs. the USSR conflict.

As an aside, I seem to be a fan of "speculative fiction", or "alternative time-line" fiction, which (to me) seems to be a sub-genre of science fiction. I have read many of Harry Turtledove's books, and generally enjoy delving into the "what ifs" that form the seeds of the novels of his I've read. That "what if" mentality is a large part of why I find this particular thread so interesting!

I look forward to your commentary on the involvement of China in a potential post-WW II "Allies" vs. USSR conflict.

Regards,
Tom

[jb]

...how 'bout an Elbe river crossing by the allies along with some "German " units.This is what Patton wanted to do.
One thing to consider:would the Germans be outfitted in OD green? And would they Paint stars on the panhters

[jb]

...how 'bout an Elbe river crossing by the allies along with some "German " units.This is what Patton wanted to do.
One thing to consider:would the Germans be outfitted in OD green? And would they Paint stars on the panthers

[1ComOpsCtr]

Tom,

There are several pretty good sites on China's internal struggles. Here is an interesting quote from one of them:

Moscow had sent their German, Otto Braun, to advise the Chinese communist group. The Red Army was now under the leadership of Otto Braun, (Chinese name of Li De) Bo Gu, (a Moscow trained Chinese), and Zhou Enlai. Mao was not in a leadership role and had no say in the operations, military or otherwise. After a year of terrible losses (about 60,000 men), one disastrous battle after another throughout Chiang's Fifth Campaign, the end was near. As autumn 1933 gave way to winter 1934, the Fifth Campaign chewed into Communist territory. The Soviet Republic contracted again and again. By autumn of 1934, the Communists had lost 58% of their territory. It was decided that the Red Army must leave the area in order to survive.

This web site is procommunist but it offers some interesting information in small easy bites: http://www.paulnoll.com/China/Long-March/l

Granted, this was in the mid-thirties and the situation changed back and forth quite often but it gives you a little insight into Russian efforts to gain control, but at this time they were not doing to well.

Wil

[DrBig]

I look forward to your commentary on the involvement of China in a potential post-WW II "Allies" vs. USSR conflict.

What time frame?

[tstockton]

Dr. Big,

(re: "I look forward to your commentary on the involvement of China in a potential post-WW II "Allies" vs. USSR conflict.")

What time frame?

What I was thinking about was immediately following the end of WW II -- say mid-1945 or so, and maybe ending in late 1946 or early 1947.

Regards,
Tom Stockton