Need help with Russian and Polish unit organization

[CA-68]

Hello everyone

I collect and paint WWII naval minis, but would like to start to build some modern ground forces. My main interests are Former Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, from the cold war era to the present (Especially Poland)

I am afraid im after a lot of information, so if anyone can suggest books or websites, i would really appreciate that! During the cold war (say late 70s to the collapse of the USSR) i would like to have some forces from, well, the USSR itsself, Poland, East Germany, and perhaps Hungary

Post cold war, i would like to have forces from Russia, the Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, ill go from there...but am not sure where to start?
Im not sure how many tanks are in a Russian (then or now) company, or what would be the usual ratio of tanks to infantry in combined forces? How many guns or SP guns in an artillery unit? How many Hind helicopters in a unit? WWII info seems quite easy to find...and did Russian unit organization change with the fall of the Soviet Union?

Will T-72s be a good stand-in for the Polish PT-91s? They look pretty similar to me, tho the Poles have ERA on their tanks, at least in every pic i have seen. I assume Russian infantry would be a good stand in for other Cold-War era troops from the other countries? Do the other countries have similar unit organization to the USSR/Russia?

And last but not least....what was the frontline Cold-war era MBT, the T72 or the T80? Thanks!

PS i dont expect anyone to painstakingly answer each and every question, to explain units, etc (if you do, thanks! if not, i understand) any information would be great, and would give me a starting point at least.

[Mk 1]

During the cold war (say late 70s to the collapse of the USSR) i would like to have some forces from, well, the USSR itsself, Poland, East Germany, and perhaps Hungary
...

Im not sure how many tanks are in a Russian (then or now) company, or what would be the usual ratio of tanks to infantry in combined forces? How many guns or SP guns in an artillery unit? How many Hind helicopters in a unit? WWII info seems quite easy to find...and did Russian unit organization change with the fall of the Soviet Union?

Pulling this from memory, no sources at hand, but I think I got this stuff down pretty well (for the past 30 years), so here goes.

It may look a little complex at first, but it is really pretty simple. There were several variations, but the basic set-up was to build units of 3 (often 3 + support).

Tank Battalion: HQ + 3 Tank Companies
Tank Company: HQ + 3 Tank Platoons
Tank Platoon: 3 Tanks (one is platoon leader)
So the total per tank company would be 10 tanks.

Tank Battalion HQ was 1 CO's tank, 1 XO's APC/IFV, three or four trucks or utility vehicles (1 food, 1 fuel, 1 ammo, 1 liason). Tank Company HQ was 1 CO's tank, 1 NCO's utility vehicle.


Motor Rifle Battalion: HQ + 3 Motor Rifle Companies + 1 Mortar Company + 1 AT Company
Motor Rifle Company: HQ + 3 Motor Rifle Companies + 1 MG platoon
Motor Rifle Platoon: 3 Squads in 3 APC/IFV (one is platoon leader), often + 1 MANPAD AAGW in platoon leader's APC, or 2 MANPAD AAGWs in 1 IFV.

Motor Rifle Battalion HQ was 1 command squad in 1 APC/IFV, plus 3 or 4 trucks / utility vehicles. Motor Rifle Company HQ was 1 command squad in 1 APC/IFV, plus 1 NCO's utility vehicle.

Mortar Company: HQ of 1 squad + APC, 3 Mortar Platoons of 2 120mm Mortars + 2 APCs (total: 7 APCs, 6 mortars)
AT Company: HQ of 1 squad + APC/IFV, 2 AT Platoons of 4 AT Weapons Teams in 2 APCs/IFVs (total: 5 APCs/IFVs, 8 AT teams)
MG Platoon: 2 APC/IFV with 2 SFMG and 2 AGL teams (total: 2 APC/IFVs, 4 weapons teams)

Attachements might include a recovery vehicle, a sanitary vehicle (ambulance), and/or an AOP vehicle (artillery command variant of an APC/IFV) attached to a battalion HQ. More often at the regiment HQ, but sometimes at the battalion HQ. Very rarely lower than that.

Each Regiment (Tank or Motor Rifle) was typically constructed of HQ + 3 Primary Arm Battalions + 1 Supporting Arm Battalion + 1 Artillery Battalion.

The Soviets did not tend to form mixed combat teams by cross-attaching, as the US did. Rather, the Soviet approach was to mix 1 to 3 in their structure. So a Tank Regiment would have 3 Tank Battalions supported by an integral 1 Motor Rifle Battalion as their authorized structure, while a Motor Rifle Regiment would have 3 Motor Rifle Battalions supported by an integral 1 Tank Battalion. Depending on the mission and the commander's judgement, the regiment's supporting battalion might be kept intact for a particular purpose, or might be divided into 3 parts and parcelled out as 1 company to each primary arm battalion.
Artillery beyond mortars was available at the Regimental level and higher. The Regimental arty battalion was typically HQ + 3 Batteries. Each battery was typically 6 122mm guns (usually SPGs by the 1970s). Some batteries were 8 guns. It was common for the batteries to travel seperately, often assigned in direct support of individual battalions of the regiment. But they could concentrate battalion-level fires pretty quickly when called upon. Typically the battery COs traveled in their command APCs with arms battalion HQ groups, and the arty battalion CO travelled with the regimental HQ group. The COs served as the forward observers. The battery and battalion XOs travelled in arty command APCs with the guns, to serve as the fire direction centers.

Thus a common formation for heavy combat might be a Motor Rifle Battalion of 3 Motor Rifle Companies, with its own Mortar and AT companies, and with an attached Tank Company. With the Rifle Battalion HQ there would be an AOP vehicle with a battery CO who could call fire directly from his own battery very quickly, or call to the arty battalion CO or XO for a full battalion fire mission when needed.

It would be uncommon to break the formation down below the battalion level, to individual companies with seperate missions. Might happen on the defense with Motor Rifle companies.

Now for the first variation. In a Motor Rifle Regiment, the tank platoons could well have 4 tanks. So the tank company would be 13 tanks.

Motor Rifle formations in Tank Regiments tended to have IFVs. Motor Rifle Divisions tended to operate 1 Regiment of IFVs, and 2 Regiments of APCs.

The common IFV was the BMP or the BMP-2. During the transitional period from BMP to BMP-2, the BMP-2 was supplimenting rather than replacing the BMP in many units. So usually the support formations (AAGW, MG, or AT) got the BMP-2s, and the infantry platoons kept the BMPs. BMP companies tended NOT to have the MG platoon.

The common APC for Motor Rifle formations was the 8-wheeled BTR family (BTR-60 > 70 > 80). Efforts were made to keep one vehicle type per battalion for logistical simplicity, but mixes were occasionally seen. BTR companies tended to HAVE the MG platoon.

Up through about the end of the 1970s, the AT companies had a platoon of long-range ATGWs, and a platoon of shorter-range RCLs. After the Soviets got SACLOS missiles, the RCLs were replaced by a second platoon of ATGWs.

Will T-72s be a good stand-in for the Polish PT-91s?

PT-91 is a licensed derivative of the T-72. Only a purist would notice the differences (even that, with a magnifying glass). GHQ model called the T-74 (W28: looks like a T-72M1 to me) is the best choice, I think.

And last but not least....what was the frontline Cold-war era MBT, the T72 or the T80?

Depends on where and when.

Up to late 1960s, frontline was mostly T-55. In the 1960s the T-62 supplimented, but never replaced, the T-55.

From end of the 60s through early 80s, the best choice for the inter-German boarder would be T-64. T-72 was seen as the lower-end cousin of the T-64. Widely exported, and used for the bulk of formations stationed within the Soviet Union. But the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) got the premium tanks, first the T-64, then the T-80 (a T-64 derivative).

T-80 began replacing T-64s in the 1980s. The upgrade was never completed. Some formations were still equipped with T-64s when the GSFG was sent home at the end of the cold war.

Today the T-80 is produced in the Ukraine. It still is an important tank in the Russian inventory, but the Russian-produced T-90 (a T-72 derivative) is gradually becoming the more prominent tank in Russia's army.

PS i dont expect anyone to painstakingly answer each and every question, to explain units, etc (if you do, thanks! if not, i understand) any information would be great, and would give me a starting point at least.

No pain involved. Just a bit of typing and bandwidth.

(Oh, and I hope I got most of it right. Sure I'll be corrected where I've missed.)

[jb]

Mk1 has the TO&Es pretty well wrapped up, but the Soviets and their Pac allies did actually cross attach to a degree. In the '70s the main attack formations would be the Mech Rifle and Tank Regiment, most notably the MR, of the MR or tank division.
In the attack which would be on a front of 20-40 km wide would be the following;
Division recon battalion spread across this front,looking for enemy ,bottlenecks,and crossings. Next would following close behind would be an advance guard. In either a MR or Tank division this would be a reinforced tank battalion from the divisions tank regiment. The advance guard is reinforced with artillery, a mech rifle company (from one of the MR reg's battalions),engineers,and AA defense. This advaance guard composition may vary DEPENDING ON THE TACTICAL SITUATION.
The forward screen, or security of this formation would most certainly be a tank company with a MR platoon attached.
The mission of the advance guard is to respond to the reconnaissance screen.
You may get quite the variety of mixed formations from the above TO&Es,and this is just the advance guard. Behind this advance guard will be a couple more MR or Tank regiments a dozen km behind to be employed where necessary to smash resistance or manuever around enemy that is pinned by advance guard formations.
This information is taken from the manuals that I have and used from the 70's.
Sure the Soviets had pretty static or ratified formations, but the phrase "depending on the tactical situation" will have a lot of variation involved...
So Wargamers take note,don't be afraid to cross attach with the Soviets! They are flexible.

[Timothy OConnor]

Lester Grau's books about the Soviets in Afghanistan demonstrate just how flexible their army was. They're collections of after action reports from Soviet platoon, company, and battalion commanders and Afghan fighters. As you begin this project I urge you to have a look at them.

Conventional wargamer wisdom is that the Soviet army was as monolithic as their form of government (it turns out their government was not quite so monolithic...it was riven with lots of very "entrepreneurial " corruption just like communist China today...Russian post-cold war oligarchs didn't come from nowhere!). But when it comes to real-world fighting, as opposed to the standard fictional Fulda Gap scenario popular with us gamers, the Soviets were flexible. Their client states often fought in a manner close to Soviet doctrine (eg the Syrians in '73) but even they were capable of creative tactics and initiative (eg breaching the Golan tank barrier).

When it comes to the Soviets themselves their operations in Afghanistan show platoons, companies, and battalions operating effectively independent of higher level orgainzations. In most modern rules this is impossible since most modern rules would not allow Soviet companies and platoons to maneuver on their own (in most rules the Soviets are forced to maneuver at a level one higher than the game's nominal scale...so if troop stands represent platoons and units are companies then Soviet troops move only in battalions). This flies in the face of actual experience in Afghanistan and Chechnya (and even WWII!).

The Soviets (and especially their client states) certainly have their issues with equipment quality and skill due to lack of training and money. Thus they have been forced to rely upon numbers at times and even then suffered defeat (again, the Syrians in '73 are a good example of this). But for your project I recommend that you also consider actual Soviet combat operations which just might surprise you with respect to Soviet flexibility. Heck, when it comes to adherence to doctrine even the US military has been criticised by other nations for relying too much upon SOP when inappropriate (eg British criticism of American ops in Iraq).

[jb]

Up to late 1960s, frontline was mostly T-55. In the 1960s the T-62 supplimented, but never replaced, the T-55.

From end of the 60s through early 80s, the best choice for the inter-German boarder would be T-64. T-72 was seen as the lower-end cousin of the T-64. Widely exported, and used for the bulk of formations stationed within the Soviet Union. But the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) got the premium tanks, first the T-64, then the T-80 (a T-64 derivative).

T-80 began replacing T-64s in the 1980s. The upgrade was never completed. Some formations were still equipped with T-64s when the GSFG was sent home at the end of the cold war.

...the T-64 was really a production type experiment dealing with the 125 main gun and the auto load system. It was actually one of the Soviet Unions better quality production models too. Using them in large numbers at least not until the later 70's (1975+) should really be considered. The T-72 was what followed up after trials with the T-64. This was the Soviet Unions main production replacement for the T-62 series. I would also not consider these in any great numbers until 1976 and after. Even at this timeframe (1975-80) consider seeing tens of thousands of T-54,55,and T-10ms in second and third line units, and still thousands of T-62s in first line units. ( one of the reasons why we developed the A-10 and hundreds of TOW mounted AH-1s!)

[Mk 1]

So Wargamers take note,don't be afraid to cross attach with the Soviets! They are flexible.

Hmm. Perhaps I was not as clear to my intent as I had thought.

Attach? Yes. All the time.

Cross-attach like the US Army did in this timeframe? Very rare.

I had intended to convey that the Soviets did attach infantry to tank formations, and vice versa. But they did not take two companies, and have each give a platoon to the other to form two mixed combat teams, nor take two battalions, and have each give a company to the other, to form two mixed combat task forces, as was done under the US Army mech warfare doctrine.

In the US model, a tank company would give up a platoon of tanks to a mech infantry company, and receive in return a platoon of mech infantry. So the US company combat team would operate with 2 platoons of the primary arm, and 1 platoon of the supporting arm. This is what I meant by cross-attaching.

The Soviets used a different approach. A tank unit could well have infantry attached, but the tank unit would not give up any of its tanks in reply. So to take JB's example of the forward detatchement, the tank company would have an infantry platoon attached. It would operate at full strength in tanks + attached infantry, rather than having some of its tank strength replaced by infantry on the American model.

Now, that said, it was not impossible for a company to have a platoon taken away. This was often done to create a battalion reserve. So also a battalion might loose a company to create a regimental reserve. But this was not typically done to units to create combined arms formations. Just to create a reserve.

As to Soviet flexibility ... yes, wargamers (and American writers) often portray the Soviets as unnecessarily inflexible. The Soviet army was quite flexible, not only during the cold war, but also in the later stages of WW2. Creative tactics, aggressive maneuvers, feints, deception and surprise were all very much a part of the officer's tool kit. However, for heavy combat (as opposed to anti-insurgency work) the Soviet doctrine placed heavy emphasis on concentrating combat resources. So for an assault on the NATO positions on the inter-German boarder, large formations are not out of place.

A Soviet defensive screen might be constructed of company-sized infantry positions, which could be spread out pretty thin as needed, with battalion heavy weapons parcelled out to the companies if the front covered by each was more than a few hundred meters.

This flexibility in thinning the defensive line was quite deliberate as a supporting effort to the concentration of forces for the attack.

The main effort would be typically divisions attacking and maneuvering as coordinated entities. For an advance-to-contact against unknown enemy positions, the division would typically maneuver in a 2-up formation (ie: 2 regiments side-by-side, with the third following up behind whichever of the front 2 was most successful). In that case, the regiments might advance with battalions 2-up as well.

For a breakthrough effort against a known enemy line, the division would typically advance with regiments echeloned in depth (ie: 3 regiments one behind the other on a 1 regiment-wide front) so the full weight of the division's artillery could concentrate on a 1 regiment-wide front, and so that a defending force, even if it was able to resist the first regiment's attack, would be worn down by successive regiments attacking in rapid sequence. In this case the regiments would typically advance with battalions 3-up, but with each battaion advancing with its companies 2-up, with the third company ready to halt and provide fire-support while the front 2 companies advanced at speed.

The result of a breakthrough attack would be a sort of buzz-saw effect on the defenses. The Soviets developed this style of attack quite thoroughly during WW2. The Germans never came to understand it, and wrote mostly about the Soviet's overwhelming numerical superiority. Well, yes, they did have more forces than the Germans. But they also knew how to thin out their line, and concentrate in depth for their breakthroughs. By 1944 the Germans could never stand up to a Soviet deliberate attack. It didn't matter how much you dug in. Nor how much you re-inforced your line. Your only hope of defending was to have a strong mobile reserve, to try to cut-off the penetration once it occured. You could never hope to prevent the penetration.

As American military planners came to understand how widely the Soviets taught and practiced these doctrines, they came to see the Soviets as inflexible. That is not at all true. Yes, this kind of maneuvering was well understood, and oft practiced in large scale maneuvers by the Soviets. Not so by the Americans. American maneuvers focused on small unit tactics, not large formation evolutions.

A Soviet division could go from an administrative echelon road-march formation (the organization of the units as they advanced through friendly rear areas) to an attack formation on either of these models (regiments 1-up or 2-up) as a single evolution, on a single order from the division commander. It was not that this was all they knew how to do, but that this was one thing they knew how to do very well. An American Brigade or Division could not be expected to shift to a well coordinated attack from a road-march with anything like the speed of a Soviet Division.

Or so I've read. And heard. But never seen.

[Timothy OConnor]

I'm not certain about cross attachment in the American sense but in Afghanistan they operated in combined arms formations at battalion and below and both battalions and companies undertook independent ops. Here's a typical example from "The Soviet-Afghan War":

A battalion commander recounts an operation against a muj held town. His BMP battalion was reinforced by "a tank company and reconnaissance company, a self-propelled artillery battery, a platoon of ZSU 23-4s, and a sapper squad." A wargamer's delight! Mech infantry, tanks, recon, arty, AA,and engineers in one command!

As for initiative and creativity the muj figured out that a UNESCO protected fortress would make a perfect base. Since it was an historical site UNSESCO delcared it off limits to Soviet heavy weapons fire. So, a Russian CO made it appear that a tank had been abandoned in front of the fortress but he himself hid inside the tank. At some point the muj decided to lower the drawbridge (!) and capture the tank as a trophy. The Co then shot out the mechanism controlling the drawbridge and his hidden troops stormed the bridge and took the fortress with small arms.

In fact the book contains a full chapter on combined arms ops which include low-level coordination between mech infantry, armor, arty, helicopters, and air support. The editor notes that "Principally, tanks participated in combat as subunits. They were attached to motorized rifle and airborne battalions and fought as tank platoons and sometimes as tank companies."

For a massed attack on Western Europe the Soviets would probably be more likely to operate in higher level homogeneous formations. But even they would recognize the need to coordinate at lower levels, especially in the dense and chaotic terrain of Germany in which infantry must often protect tanks as the move through urban terrain and tanks must suppress defenders to allow the infantry to maneuver.

Maybe this all has less to do with doctrine than the nature of any given conflict. In Afghanistan and Iraq the Soviets and the Americans respectively have had to adjust their tactics to the unique nature of the fighting given troop skills and technology differences (eg UAVs vs IED emplacement teams). The same dynamic occured in Vietnam.

[CA-68]

I cant thank everyone enough for the replies, this is exactly what i was looking for. As was mentioned, mixed forces are a "wargamer's delight" and its nice to see that while the Soviets typically kept units pretty "pure", that they would use combined forces when needed. I assume modern Russian doctrine (I saw Chechnya mentioned) is pretty similar to Cold-War era tactics, so it would probably be OK to distribute modern Russian (or former Warsaw Pact nations, like Poland's) forces in a pretty similar manner?

Thanks a bunch again, time to order some BMPs and infantry up!