Korean War on History Channel,

[dougeagle]

Just wondering if anybody else saw this episode?

I found it quite interesting actually, as I'm more towards WW2, Modern combat for late 70's as well as the Arab Israeli Wars of '67 and '73. In some ways, it almost seemed like it was one sided, but mind you, I don't think that there was a lot of action filmed on the North Korean side of the war. Aside from that, when winter hit and the Allied forces didn't have proper winter gear, it almost reminds me of 'Battle of the Buldge' and how the Americans didn't have winter gear either as well as the time frame from the end of WW2 to the start of the Korean War meant that the fighting machine of the Allied forces was now almost non existent, thus the actual fighting prowess was gone. Also, which makes me wonder, was according to the allied armour, they were having problems against the Soviet made T-34 and that shots were bouncing off of the hulls. So, if WW2 had continued with the Allies taking on the Soviets, how would they have faired in it?
The different battles that did take place, in which a particular hill had changed hands several times was interesting. How allied artillery was landing near the top of the hill to try and stop the Chinese from taking the hill and so forth were all interesting indeed.

In some ways, I wish the program had been longer than an hour, but what can you do. Again, this was interesting to watch and then to find out that the Canadians who fought there didn't receive recognition for it by our government until a few years ago...shame.

[WHM]

The M4A3E8 was able to handle the T-34. The tanks that had the problem were the M-24/Chaffee light tanks. These were I believe the tanks initially deployed since they were the closest to Korea in Japan as part of the occupation forces. The M-24 was in Japan because the bridges were not able to to take the weight of the U.S. Army's heavier tanks.

As for U.S. tanks vs. Soviet armor, Oy Gavalt, such a subject.

There are those on this forum that can go into great detail, but against the heavier models, ISU-152s, etc. to put it simply it would be problematic.

However, there is the tendency by some to cast Soviet armor as nearly invincible. The IS-3 as an example created quite an impression on western observers, but Armor magazine it was I think had an article that while I don't recall the details frankly said there was alot this vehicle left to be desired. A big gun and rakish lines does not necessarily make a world class tank.

[Mk 1]

The M4A3E8 was able to handle the T-34. The tanks that had the problem were the M-24/Chaffee light tanks. ... The M-24 was in Japan because the bridges were not able to to take the weight of the U.S. Army's heavier tanks.

Correct, correct, and correct.

The only tanks the NK's used were a few regiments of T-34-85s and some SU-76s. NK armor participated only in the early stages of the conflict, during the NK run to Pusan. After Big Mac's landing and Inchon, NK armor was rarely if ever seen.

The first US tanks into action were the Chaffee's in Task Force Smith. They were very roughly handled by NK T-34-85s.

So also the infantry had lots of trouble with the T-34s. Neither the 2.36" bazooka nor the 57mm RCL were reliable T-34 killers. This may have been in part because the 2.36" bazookas, and their rounds, were WW2 surplus that had been sitting in storage for 5 years, with little evidence of proper care (humid climate and all). The 75mm RCL that was used by US Army Infantry AT batteries at that time seems to have performed better. But a jeep with a big low-velocity (read: short-ranged) cannon on it that shouted HEY LOOK AT ME OVER HERE on its first shot was not really an ideal AT platform, and effective or not it was not very popular with its crews.

The M4 Shermans did rather well once they arrived in theater. After battle reviews of tank-vs-tank actions showed a strong and consistant positive exchange rate. The M26 Pershing did even better, and was very popular with its crews for its superior armor and gunpower ... so long as there were NK tanks around. Once the enemy armor threat dissappeared the M26 was heavily criticized as an automotive disaster, and some units traded back to M4s until the updated M46 Patton (M26 with a cogent approach to drive train) became available. Even then, the Sherman was able to get to more battlefields due to its lower total gross weight, giving it a clear advantage on wooden bridges and dirt roads with trecherously weak shoulders that wound through the Korean mountains.

But before we read too much of these results into some US vs. Soviets hypothetical clash in 1945, the following factors should be noted:

- The Shermans in Korea were almost universally armed with the 76mm gun. In May of 1945 the 75mm armed Sherman was still the majority of the tank park in ETO.

- As important as the guns themselves, by 1950 the 76mm gun had very good anti-tank ammunition. The US tanks in Korea used HVAP as their primary AT projectile. This was a VERY accurate round (better in tests than the British 17pdr, or the US 90mm), with excellent performance, that penetrated the T-34's armor very effectively. In 1945 HVAP rounds were so rare as to be irrelevant on an operational level (something like 1 out of 100,000 76mm and 3-inch rounds shipped to ETO from September 44 to May 45 were HVAP), and the first generations of US HVAP in 1944/45 had a poor design which made them far more likely to riccochet from highly-angled plate (like the T-34's glacis). Both the design of the HVAP and its availability were not resolved until after the end of WW2.

- More important that either the guns or the ammo, the US tank crews that arrived with the M4 Shermans showed a higher level of training than their NK counter-parts. It is easy to fall into the trap of viewing today's US Army and assuming that the US soldier was always a well-trained professional warrior. That is not the case. The first US troops to see action in Korea were pretty much greenhorns who were doing easy occupation duty in Japan. But for whatever reason the tankers that arrived later were pretty capable fellows who took their gunnery seriously, and with a very accurate gun did good work. It is not clear how the balance of skills would have played-out in central Europe in 1945 ... the US was in pretty good shape, but the Soviets were also at their peak of power and combat efficiency.

There are those on this forum that can go into great detail, but against the heavier models, ISU-152s, etc. to put it simply it would be problematic.

To the US tankers, Soviet armor would have looked almost as tough as German armor in 1945. The big difference was that the US consistantly outnumbered and outmaneuvered the Germans on almost every occasion. The US would not have enjoyed the advantage of numbers against the Soviets, and the Soviets were far more enclined to aggressive maneuver than the Germans, or even the US, by 1945.

The airpower game might have been more to US liking. But on the ground it would have been a pretty unpleasant fight.

However, there is the tendency by some to cast Soviet armor as nearly invincible. The IS-3 as an example created quite an impression on western observers, but Armor magazine it was I think had an article that while I don't recall the details frankly said there was alot this vehicle left to be desired. A big gun and rakish lines does not necessarily make a world class tank.

Armor Magazine ran a pretty well-known article (in the late 1990's IIRC) that concluded the IS-3 was pretty much a wash-out as a combat vehicle, and more of a propoganda machine. I've seen criticisms of that article by Russian authors who demonstrate how some pretty basic mis-interpretations of Soviet post-war policy in that article led to some questionable conclusions. Who is right? Hard to say.

I've climbed around on and in an IS-3. It is a very compact vehicle. A Panther, or a Sherman, or a Pershing/Patton, looks like a farmyard barn in comparison. The armor is extremely thick over the frontal arc, and the sloping is rather amazing. The manufacturing finish is shockingly crude compared to US tanks. But the same can be said of the T-34s I've climbed around on/in, and I don't think anyone should question that the T-34 was an effective tank. Similar to what the folks at Aberdeen observed on the KV and T-34 that they examined during the war, I found that as crude as the finish was, it seems it was good enough where it counted. For example I could hand-crank that multi-ton turret with its MASSIVE and LONG gun easily enough to bring it onto target without a hitch.

I have seen many criticisms of how cramped the IS series tanks were. I'm a large enough fellow, but I found the fighting compartment to be no worse than many other tanks I've examined. Granted it wasn't filled with ammo, and I don't doubt that ammo would have cramped me in more as there was little in the way of dedicated (out-of-the-way) storage space. But I've examined the ammo storage on late-war Sherman 76mm (w)'s, and I'll tell you something, after the ready-rack rounds are fired I would NOT have wanted my life depending on getting the next round down the tube.

I'm not a big believer in wunder-tanks. Not German, not American, not Soviet. But neither do I believe that the Soviets would have intentionally equipped front-line troops with obviously flawed equipment. I do believe that in the crucible of WW2 they figured out pretty quickly what worked and what didn't. Late WW2 Soviet stuff was pretty darned good.

[WHM]

When it comes to U.S.western Allies vs Soviets I think caution is necessary.

Fans of the Red Army are enamored w/the idea of huge tank armies marching in huge phalanxes to the Channel and down the Iberian penninsula, but it needs to be remebered the U.S. and the West were not the bits and pieces of the Wehrmacht and the specter of 1,000 tanks facing 15,000 wasn't going to happen.

Trus, the Soviets had the heavier tanks, but the west I think would have had air superiority, better logistics, superior artillery fire control. Also the moral strength the average Soviet soldier had to come out of the USSR and pursue the Germans isn't a given if they had to face the west in the west. The atrocities of the Germans wasn't mirrored by the west. in other words the west hadn't devistated the USSR. As for the Germans being rehabilited and reformed to fight is hard to accept. Even if the political will on the part of the west was there how do you accomplish this with a major war going on in the same neighborhood ?

I listened to a discussion once about the attitude of the Russians historically, both Imperial and Soviet and basically they do not do as well if they are the initial aggressors attacking from inside their national borders, but if they are the ones attacked first, Oy Vay!

Regarding the whole NATO vs WP thing, opinions on who would win is dependent on when this would happen. If during the 1980's NATO has the edge, in the 1960's the WP. But if you kind of wonder if they thought they could then why didn't they try? ea I know, A-Bombs, but then again, maybe they WOULDN'T have been used. There is historical precident. No poison gas during WWII and ther was only one general fleet action (Jutland) in WWI. But no one was willing to bet on it, but if you consider from the Soviet's view why use Nucs if you are trying to occupy western Europe? You want a burned out cinder? As for the west the "better dead then Red" view maynot have been taken by the West Germans. Bonn to the U.S., DON"T NUC US!! Just my speculating here.

In their calculas I wonder sometimes if the Soviets ever considered their demographics. Consider how many millions died in the 20th century starting w/the Russo-Japaenese War, WWI, The Civil War, Russo-Polish War, Stalin's Purges, Lennin's Purges, WWII, not to mention how the birth rate was effected by a oppressive regeime. The ethnic Russian population of Russia is declining and the non-Slavis is rising

Also, the post war Soviet soldier, was he the same man as his father during WWII? Would they have the same level of disicipline as shown in the orders to charge without a weapon and pick up the one of the man who falls? The same level of blind obedience?

The point I am trying to make is if there had been a continuation of war in Europe after the defeat of Germany I do not think it would be a obvious conclusion of a Soviet victory.

As for wargaming something like this, I think to make it interesting it is necessary there be a balance. Meaning Stuarts facing off against KV-1s, ISU-152s will grow real old real fast for the one player.

When, on those very, very, very rare occasions I get to play, it usually is the NATO player defends w/the WP attacking, odds being 3:1.

Actually this type of engagemant is why I find the Isreali's defense of Booster Ridge in 1973 very interesting.

OK, I am done bloviating.

Hope I said something intersting

[DrBig]

The morale issue is an excellent point. They didn't call it "The Great Patriotic War" for nothing. After the Barbarossa storm was over, Stalin whipped the Red Army into a frenzie with propaganda regarding German atrocities: rape, hangings, executions, etc.

What's he gonna say about the Yanks & Brits in May '45 to get his troops motivated again? They wanted to go home too, after Berlin.

The Germans have a very good example in this with Stailngrad. Before Stalingrad, it was Hoorah Hitler! Wasn't quite the same atmosphere after 1942, and combat effectiveness showed this

[Mk 1]

OK, I am done bloviating.

Well, gee, if we're going to worry about that kind of stuff, I should offer this caveat:
CAUTION: SIGNIFICANT BLOVIATION FOLLOWS

Hope I said something intersting

If you set such a high standard as that, you will silence many of us on this fine forum.

When it comes to U.S.western Allies vs Soviets I think caution is necessary.

Quite agree. Many shades of "maybe".

The point I am trying to make is if there had been a continuation of war in Europe after the defeat of Germany I do not think it would be a obvious conclusion of a Soviet victory.

Agreed -- not obvious at all.

Nor is it obvious, as some "Patton fans" posit, that the US would role all over the Soviets in some form of prelude to Desert Storm.

Much depends on the assumptions used to set-up the conflict. Who starts it? Where, when, how? Does either side have time to prepare, or is it a 'come as you are' party?

If the conflict came right at the end of the fighting against the Germans, the US would be in pretty good shape. US forces were not nearly as exhausted as Soviet forces, either in level of equipment and manpower, nor in morale.

The morale issue is an excellent point. They didn't call it "The Great Patriotic War" for nothing. After the Barbarossa storm was over, Stalin whipped the Red Army into a frenzie with propaganda regarding German atrocities: rape, hangings, executions, etc.

The Soviets had not really pushed the "propaganda" of attrocities on their army. For much of the war they had actually shied away from it. The soldiers had largely seen it with their own eyes through the march westward. The Soviet propaganda machine focussed more on idealized versions of home and family, of patriotic duty, and the "science" of the "new Soviet man". As they started to cross the borders, that is to say AFTER they had seen the attrocities, the propoganda shifted to themes of righteous retribution -- but even here it was often in political terms, punishing the Germans for the insult to the Soviet state -- as it was to do with attrocities. But almost as shocking to the Red Army soldiers as the attrocities they had seen in liberating their own country, was the confrontation with European levels of material wealth as they enterred East Prussia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, even Poland, and ultimately Germany proper. It enraged many Red Army soldiers to no end to think that these people who had so much came into their miserably poor country to make it more miserable and poorer, but it also fatigued them and made them less "politically reliable" to see how much better off the capitalists seemed to be.*

No doubt turning on the Americans and Brits, who had been providing much of the goods that the average Red Army soldier used on a daily basis (dried eggs, SPAM, boots, trucks and jeeps) would have been a further cause of emotional fatigue.

That said, if the clash had been caused by (or could be blamed on) the Americans or the Brits, then the average Ivan would probably have continued with his stoicism, and carried on in the fight. In particular, any attempt to re-arm the Germans would have made a causus beli in many a Soviet's worldview.

More to the points that matter with Micro Armor, a clash between East and West at the close of hostilities with the Germans would have been rather interesting from an equipment and forces match-up.

Both sides would have found an opponant that was more mobile than the Germans had been on an operational level. The US had the capability to be more mobile than the Soviets, with more trucks, more infantry carriers, more self-propelled artillery, and better logistics. But the US did not have the depth of practical experience at sweeping mobile operations to call upon. The US had never managed to encircle a single German division that was not hemmed-in by natural obsticals (like a sea-coast). The Soviets had encircled dozens upon dozens of divisions, corps, and even armies during 1944.

Both would also have found an opponent that was probably less flexible tactically. As much as the popular image of the Soviets is wrapped around human waive attacks, the US infantry was not much better on many occasions. Both armies were somewhat uneven in the quality of their leadership at all levels from platoon through army group.

US artillery was better. More responsive, more accurate, better controlled, and able to deliver volumes of fire that the Germans had not managed for 3 or 4 years. The Soviets would have suffered under their tender administrations. But Soviet artillery, while lacking in the responsiveness of the Americans, had the ability to deliver crushing levels of fire across very wide areas of frontage. Any US forces actually caught by a Soviet fire program would have suffered dearly for it. The receiveing end of these kinds of fires would have been unfamiliar for both armies.

The Soviets would probably have launched in with breakthrough units composed of JSs and ISUs, covered by a level of artillery preparation that the US Army had never really experienced. US Infantry Divisions would have had a hard time of it. But they would probably have faired better than the Germans except in the cases where they got caught fully by the arty prep fires. US Army had tank battalions assigned to almost every infantry division. The Germans infantry divisions never had Panzers assigned to them, and the average German Landser only saw them at railroad depots as they were transiting to somewhere else, while very occasionally having a company of StuGs to back up his own division of troopers.

The US Tank Destroyers might have done particularly well. The doctrine and organization of the TDs had been constructed specifically to counter the kind of attack that the Soviets preferred -- a torrent of medium tanks surging into the rear areas after the line had been breached (by artillery and infantry with heavy tank support). If the US Army applied its TDs per their doctrine, they might have been a very effective counter.

US Armored Divisions might not have done as well. They really only faced a German army that was capable of offensive manuever in the early stages of the Tunisian campaign. By 1945 they had grown accustomed to maneuvering around an opponant that was largely stationary on an operational level. The Soviets were far more accustomed to swirling fluid battles, and had commanders at the corps and army levels (roughly equivelant to division and corps levels for the Americans) who had demonstrated repeated skills in shifting the axis of their attacks, of bluffing and counter-marching, and by-passing or encircling points of opposition. It is quite likely that several of the more aggressive US Armored Divisions would have been been encircled or otherwise cut-off by the combination of their own willingness to stick their necks out, and their low familiarity with the look and feel of a noose.

Now, if you back it off a few years ... say to the timeframe of the Berlin Airlift, you get a different scenario altogether.

By that time the US had eliminated the Tank Destroyers completely from their inventory. The forces of both sides had been drawn down, but the US forces had been drawn down farther ... to a small fraction of their immediate post-war levels. Both US and Soviet units are mostly manned by green recruits -- except for the officer corps, all of the experienced "frontovics" had already gone home.

I would de-rate US performance more than Soviet. Keep all the Soviet heavy tanks and ISUs, cut about half of the Soviet T-34-85s. Toss out most American Sherman 75s, leaving mostly Shermans 76s. There are no TDs to back them up (unless the French show up with some M36s). There are a few Pershings about, but not many. Many infantry companies have only 2 platoons, and most artillery battalions have only 1 firing battery (cronic manpower shortages).

So in 1945 I see the possibilities (and challenges) of facing off against IS-2s and ISU-152s with Sherman 75s backed by M36s and a short ton of 105mm and 155mm howitzers. Or chasing a brigade of T-34s with a battalion of M18s. While in 1948 I'd see have to face IS-3s and ISU-152s with Sherman 76s backed by ... nothing. Or to try to chase T-34s with Shermans or Chaffees. D@mn, where are my Thunderbolts when I need 'em?

An interesting period for "what-if" games. Many possible scenarios.


*Note: Views on this largely derived from reading "Ivan's War", a recent book describing the perspectives of average Soviets during the war, written after reviewing hundreds of letters between Red Army troops and families recently opened up in the archives, and after conducting more than 100 interviews with surviving war veterans. Really a fascinating read.
http://www.amazon.com/Ivans-War-Life-De ... 928&sr=8-1

[DrBig]

The Soviets had not really pushed the "propaganda" of attrocities on their army.

you sure about that? That's usually given as an excuse for the '45 East Prussian atrocities. Could be crap though, I wouldn't be surprised.

[thenorthman]

Another account to consider is the losses of the Soviets in manpower. There are different estimates but they range from 20 million to 50 million civilian and military (the last estimate is a more recent one that was released since the Iron Curtain collapsed).

Did they "even" have the man power to sustain further causalities that were sure to continue if the war went on. That is the real question.

Of course 1939 stats show Soviet Union with 168 million and US at 131 million so really who knows...

Add in UK's population at 47 million, Canada at 11 million, Australia 6.9 million, then German ? at 69 million. Now these are 1939 numbers but total German population was down 7 to 8 million by wars end....but yea it might be more harmful to be using German troops against the Soviets in terms of boosting Soviet resistance like mentioned earlier.

Would the US of put up with casualties mounting in the millions? Probably not so "what if's" got to love them.

Sean

[voltigeur]

Soviet casualties is a valid point often overlooked in these discussions. The Russians had lost so many people (Consider the wounded and disabled) that there is some speculation thier society could not have sustained much more.

Also there is a persistant idea of the Russians being the aggressor. I met someone who was in the Military Liaison Mission in Germany. one of the stark revilations is tha the Soviets were legitimatly scared more of us attacking them rather than planning to attack us.

Like any responsible army they did have plans to invade but my friend said for evary manuver where they practiced attacking an opponent they had at least 4 practicing defence.

There was also a real feeling that the west was too forgiving of the Nazi's. While much of this is the result of Soviet propaganda the Russians felt we were way too lienient on Germany and would join the Germans in crushing their "Revolution".

I wonder what the Soviets knew of Patton's comments?

[WHM]

voltigeur's comment about his acqaintance regarding the Soviet's fear of the west attacking, to me anyway, begs the question, are they kidding?

From the time of Stalin to throughout the Cold War, the one area the Soviets strong point was the penetration of the west by their intelligence services. So how could they NOT know the west/NATO was on the stratgeic defensive?

When you consider the open sources such as news magazines, military subject magazines that were available at the newstand (I used to buy them) describing the strength of conventional forces just how could they expect or fear a conventional attack when these sources showed such a hugh dicrepancy?

[Mk 1]

voltigeur's comment about his acqaintance regarding the Soviet's fear of the west attacking, to me anyway, begs the question, are they kidding?

No more so than the US would be kidding about fearing sneak attacks after Pearl Harbor or 9/11.

There is a lot of history at play. As aggressive as our propoganda made the Soviets look, in fact they were a staunchly conservative hierarchy. Paranoid from day one, and not inclined to initiate any direct aggressive action unless they were practically lock-solid assured of success. Everything that was at all risky was handled through proxies.

WW2 was an almost overwhelming trauma. The fact that the Soviets were able to endure untold privation and misery does not mean that it didn't affect them. It did. Deeply.

To the Soviet mindset the "Capitalist West" tossed Nazi Germany into the same bucket as France, the UK and the US. Little to chose from among them. It was Stalin's strategy to play one against the other, keeping the Soviets OUT of the war among the capitalist powers until they had beaten each other to a pulp, at which point we has hoping to step in and grab some tastey tidbits from the wreckage. He quite naturally suspected the US and UK of the exact same mindset in their view of his struggle against Hitler's Germany, a suspicion that was re-enforced by the visible closeness between Churchill and Roosevelt, and by the repeated delays in opening the second front (he quite reasonably saw the whole North African and Mediteranean campaigns as trivial side-shows). This paranoia extended into the post-war period.

We ("the West") looked very aggressive from their perspective. You'll have trouble finding instances of un-provoked Soviet invasions of major western industrial powers like Germany, France, the UK, or the US. But you will find instances of un-provoked invasions of Soviet territory by each of those countries. Provided, of course, that you see help for the "Whites" in the Russian civil war as in unprovoked invasion of "Soviet" territory. As the Soviets do.

Remember that the Soviets (and Russians in general) had a real penchant for chess. In chess you need to be paranoid not when your opponnent openly threatens, but when your opponent maneuvers to establish his position of strength before unmasking the threat. That is the only way to survive the game. The more time you allow your opponent to spend constructing a strong position, the more dangerous the threat once it is unmasked.

Throughout the cold war the US was actively surrounding the Soviets with armies and weapons. The Soviets were constantly reacting to aggressive moves by the US. Their nuclear program was a response to US nuclear power. The formation of the Warsaw Pact was a response to the formation of NATO. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a response to US IRBMs on the Soviet boarder. US recon planes overflew Soviet territory on an almost daily basis, just as Luftwaffe planes had flown photo-recon missions over the Western Soviet Union in the Spring of 1941. Stalin had let them, whithout responding. He had convinced himself that the Germans would not attack, mostly because he preferred to believe his own strategy would work. No post-war Soviet leader was going to make that mistake again.

[thenorthman]

Another aggressive act done by us, the US, is we reacted to them putting Nuclear Weapons into Cuba. We were horrified that they would be able to get the entire eastern seaboard with these weapons with in seconds.

They only put them there because we did the same thing by putting Nuclear Weapons into Turkey.

Which was one of the defusing agreements of us removing them.

Not sure what I think totally either way if it was US or USSR being the aggressors but who knows what there mind set would of been.

This is a country that was attacked and raided three different times in its current history. Napoleon, Weimar, and then Hitler had done it. WHich two of these attacks had been in a period of less than 40 years.

I don't know about you but I would be paranoid that the world was out to get me. Despite what my countries intelligence tells me.

Sean

[WHM]

NATO was formed as a result of Soviet actions to set up communist governments in eastern and central Europe and their involvement in the Greek Civil War. In fact in Eastern Germany early 1950s they suppressed a revolt against their occupation forces. So there was a cause for a defense pact in the west. The WP didn't come about until West Germany's status changed from being occupied to an idependent, re-armed state,

Agree with your points, and I may be a little slow on the uptake, but you would think with all their intelligence organs someone would in the Kremlin or Stavka would point out the unlikelyhood of a conventional western attack on the USSR.

Understand of course their feeling of being surronded, but it is not as if they were not involved in actions the west felt were dangerous to their own security.

I wonder in their desire to hold onto east Euorope was for more "Great Russia" then as a defensive zone.

[voltigeur]

Agree with your points, and I may be a little slow on the uptake, but you would think with all their intelligence organs someone would in the Kremlin or Stavka would point out the unlikelyhood of a conventional western attack on the USSR.

One of the things that should be considered is that both sides had 2 issues they were dealing with. One was what they were telling the world, and what was being told to thier own people.

Especially in the Soviet Union there was a lot of value to keep the threat of the USA alive even if people in the upper levels knew we had no intention of an unprovoked attack. If you look at the levels of defence spending and proxy wars the USA had a reason to keep the Soviet boogy man as well. How else can you justify a 600 ship peace time navy?

The Cold War was a propoganda war as well, and people on both sides benefitted even if you feel it was a charade. Fact is, Defence contractors on both sides made Billions over the decades.

Much of the same thing is going on now.