Hopefully this post is not too confusing. My old laptop died and I have been of line the better part of a week and there are so many posts to respond to.
From my time playing Harpoon a carrier is relatively safe. As far as the discussion of a US Carrier one has to keep in mind the anticipated nature of naval warfare with missiles.
One has to look at how these battle groups protected themselves. First there is a 600 nm radius of radar coverage kept around a carrier at all times. This is supplied by the Hawkeye aircraft (Naval version of the AWACS), escorting frigates and destroyers. If a raid is detected in addition to the regular CAP (Combat Air Patrol) the carrier will launch a BARCAP(Barrier Combat Air Patrol). A BARCAP of 4 F14’s could launch 24 Phoenix missiles which were actually designed more to intercept missiles rather than aircraft. They would still have 2 to 4 Sparrow missiles each for the aircraft launching the attack.
Whatever missiles get thru that the Spruance and OH Perry have SM2E missiles and will probably knock down any thing else that is coming in but if not there are cruisers that can deliver a second round of the same high volume defense.
Only then will the carrier’s own defenses kick in. The sea sparrows can engage at med range and the Phalanx system will take care of close in work. Also keep in mind the standard CAP that is over the carrier.
Only the Soviet navy and possibly the Chinese could have ever launched enough missiles to over power the defensive scheme.
As to the hits taken by the Royal Navy. Articles that I read at the time of the war said that the SEADART system was designed for one Aircraft one Missile scenario. During the Falklands conflict every time the system detected multiple targets it would read this as an error and reset. Some ships that were hit reported their defenses never fired at incoming missiles! This was an error in both British & American systems that was quickly corrected after the war.
Naval Warfare Tactics
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piersyf
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Hi all... hope I'm not repeating stuff here, have only read half the thread...
As to movement of forces my personal preference is a 'plot', just like a CINC, but with the actual fleet (the models) laid out on a table at closer to a realistic figure/table scale. This allows formations to be clearly set and even allows for the zig zag of escorts. I admit it works best with an umpire and 2 rooms. The main reasons this works is that it is a closer simulation to the working environment of the admiral of a fleet as well as making it easier to properly calculate defences against incoming missiles (as you know the approach vector and therefore which escorts it will pass when).
As to the 'safety' of a carrier in Harpoon... I offer the following from Roger Thompson, Professor of Military Studies at Knightsbridge University and a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. (I know he's a sociologist, but works in the defence field as is mainly critical of training and motivation in the USN... take that on board as you read)
"In 1981, The NATO exercise Ocean Venture ended with much embarrassment for the U.S. Navy, and more specifically, its enormously expensive aircraft carrier battle groups.
During the exercise, a Canadian submarine slipped quietly through a carrier's destroyer screen, and conducted a devastating simulated torpedo attack on the ship. The submarine was never detected, and when the exercise umpire, a U.S. Navy officer, pronounced the carrier dead, his official report was promptly stamped classified to minimize the potential fallout. Unfortunately, a Canadian submariner leaked the story to a local newspaper, and indicated that this successful Canadian attack on an American supercarrier was by no means an isolated incident. This news caused quite a stir in Congress, and the U.S. Navy had a lot of explaining to do. Why indeed had a small, 1960s-vintage diesel submarine of the under-funded Canadian Navy been able to defeat one of America s most powerful and expensive warships, and with such apparent ease?
There are several possible answers. Firstly, Canadian submariners are extremely well trained and professional. Secondly, at that time, the Oberon submarines used by the Canadian Navy were probably the quietest in the world. A third possible reason, not so commonly stated, and with all due respect, is that the mighty U.S. Navy is simply overrated. It is my humble contention that the U.S. Navy is not all it's cracked up to be, and that is the focus of the present article.
Diesel Subs Feast on U.S. Carriers
While Canadian submarines have routinely taken on U.S. Navy carriers, other small navies have enjoyed similar victories. The Royal Netherlands Navy, with its small force of extremely quiet diesel submarines, has made the U.S. Navy eat the proverbial slice of humble pie on more than one occasion. In 1989, naval ** CENSORED ** Norman Polmar wrote in Naval Forces that during NATO s exercise Northern Star, the Dutch submarine Zwaardvis was the only orange (enemy) submarine to successfully stalk and sink a blue (allied) aircraft carrier Ten years later there were reports that the Dutch submarine Walrus had been even more successful in the exercise JTFEX/TMDI99.
During this exercise the Walrus penetrates the U.S. screen and sinks many ships, including the U.S. aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt CVN-71. The submarine launches two attacks and manages to sneak away. To celebrate the sinking the crew designed a special T-shirt. Fittingly, the T-shirt depicted the USS Theodore Roosevelt impaled on the tusks of a walrus. It was also reported that the Walrus also sank many of the Roosevelt's escorts, including the nuclear submarine USS Boise, a cruiser, several destroyers and frigates, plus the command ship USS Mount Whitney. The Walrus herself survived the exercise with no damage.
Not to be outdone by the Canadians and Dutch, the Australian submarine force has also scored many goals against U.S. Navy carriers and nuclear submarines. On September 24 2003, the Australian newspaper The Age disclosed that Australia's Collins class diesel submarines had taught the U.S. Navy a few lessons during multinational exercises. By the end of the exercises, Australian submarines had destroyed two U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and an aircraft carrier. According to the article: The Americans were wide-eyed, Commodore Deeks (Commander of the RAN Submarine Group) said. They realized that another navy knows how to operate submarines
They went away very impressed.
Not surprisingly, NATO and allied submariners are extremely confident in their ability to sink American carriers. In his book The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine, Andrew Cockburn wryly noted that European submariners on NATO exercises were far more concerned about colliding with noisy American nuclear submarines (running fast and therefore, blind) than about being attacked by American ships.
The Russians mug the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk
These examples provide ample evidence of the vulnerability of U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to attacks from diesel submarines, but of course there are other ways to sink a carrier, as the Russian Air Force knows well. In October 2000, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk was mugged by Russian SU-24 and Su-27 aircraft, which were not detected until they were virtually on top of the carrier. The Russian aircraft buzzed the carrier s flight deck and caught the ship completely unprepared. To add insult to injury, the Russians took very detailed photos of the Kitty Hawk s flight deck, and very courteously, provided the pictures to the American CO via e-mail. In the December 7, 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, Jon E. Dougherty said that the Russian photographs made it clear that there was panic aboard the Kitty Hawk. As one U.S. sailor quipped, The entire crew watched overhead as the Russians made a mockery of our feeble attempt of intercepting them.
Russia's air force is now only a faint shadow of what it once was, but even now, they can demonstrate that they can, if necessary, do significant damage to the U.S. Navy. It's little wonder then that a Russian newspaper gloated that If these had been planes on a war mission, the aircraft carrier would definitely have been sunk. Perhaps they are right. But it s not just the Russians, Canadians, Dutch and Australians who think the U.S. Navy s carrier battle groups are over-rated, expensive and extremely vulnerable. Admiral Hyman Rickover himself didn t think much of the American carrier-centered Navy, either. When asked in 1982 about how long the American carriers would survive in an actual war, he curtly replied that they would be finished in approximately 48 hours.
This isn't Top Gun
As we ve seen, U.S. carriers are remarkably vulnerable to attacks by submarines and aircraft, but what about the much-vaunted American naval aviators? How would the U.S.N. pilots fare in a dogfight with a well-trained enemy? The evidence is not encouraging. Canadian pilots routinely outperform U.S.N. aircrews in exercises, and have done so for many years. During the days of RCN carrier aviation it was well known that H.M.C.S. Bonaventure could put more planes in the air than much larger U.S.N. carriers. In the early 1980s it was revealed that the average pilot in the Canadian Air Force flew about 300 hours a year, whereas his U.S. Navy counterpart flew only about 160 hours annually. Even in this day of advanced flight simulators, there is still no substitute for the real thing (flying).
U.S. Naval aviators pride themselves as being supposedly far better than any Air Force pilots, but one merely has to look at the Canadian, Israeli and Chilean air forces to cast doubt on that assumption. The Israeli Air Force has bested the pride of the U.S. Navy, and they have done so even with less capable aircraft. A joint U.S.N.-I.A.F. air combat exercise in 2000 underlines and highlights the thesis that the U.S. Navy is overrated. On September 14, 2000, The Jerusalem Post announced that the Israelis soundly dispatched the air wing from the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (which, incidentally, was the same carrier the Dutch destroyed in 1999). Israeli F-16s squared off against American F-14s and F-18s, both of which are said to be more capable than the F-16. The final results were astonishing. The Israelis shot down a whopping 220 U.S. aircraft while losing only 20 themselves. The 10:1 kill ratio was so embarrassing that the results were not officially published to save the reputations of the U.S. Navy pilots.
Chile is certainly not a great military power, but its air force is well trained, and they too have given the U.S. Navy reason for pause. In the late 1980s, it was reported that Chilean Air Force pilots, flying the relatively unsophisticated but nimble F-5, had trounced an American carrier air group in air combat exercises. Like the Israelis, the kill ratio was 10:1 in favor of the Chileans. As usual, this incident did not receive much press coverage in the United States.
Lack of Training
Despite its vastly superior numbers, resources and weapons, the U.S. Navy, the world's only true heavyweight navy, continually fails to vanquish welterweight and lightweight naval powers. This would indicate that training, not big, expensive ships, is the key to naval power. It is training, or lack thereof, that truly undermines the performance of the U.S. Navy.
... Through his many best-selling books and movies, author Tom Clancy has created a crisp, sharp, spit-polished, efficient, and patriotic image for the U.S. Navy. Some think he should be a paid Public Relations consultant or recruiter for the U.S. submarine force. It may come as a shock to some of his readers, however, that the American sailors in his books are too good to be true, and that even some American submariners admit their training is not very good. Several recent books have effectively stripped off much of the shiny Hollywood polish on the American submarine force, most notably Petty Officer Andrew Karam s account of life on the USS Plunger, Rig Ship for Ultra Quiet (2002), and Douglas C. Waller s Big Red (2001). Both authors (Karam served on the submarine USS Plunger) said that there is a lot of hype regarding U.S. submarine training, but the reality is much less impressive. As for the legendary assertion that all U.S. submariners are experts on every system in their boats, one sailor told Waller that was All bunk. Waller explained that The (submariner s) qualification only made you familiar with the rest of the boat. It didn t mean you could actually run other parts. If (the sailor) and the other missile techs suddenly died, those nukes in the back wouldn't have a clue how to fire these rockets. Petty Officer Karam, an Engineering Laboratory Technician, concurred, and acknowledged that he could only work on other systems in a pinch . He continued The Plunger, and, for that matter, any nuke boat, was sufficiently complex that one person simply could not learn everything to that level of detail in the 14 months we were given to qualify. Not if they were doing their own jobs, too.
British allies, of course, have long ridiculed American submariners for spending too much time and effort learning about nuclear reactors. Surprisingly, Waller wrote that some U.S. Navy officers quietly agree. The Drill Coordinator on the USS Nebraska, Lieutenant Brent Kinman, told Waller that American submariners talk too much about the reactor, like mechanics, and not enough about how to fight the ship effectively: That was the problem with today s submariners, Kinman thought. They were technicians rather than warriors. The average lieutenant riding these boats considered himself a nuclear engineer first and a submarine officer second. It almost feels like we re out there just driving the reactor around This overemphasis on engineering might explain why diesel submarines are so often triumphant against U.S.N. nuclear submarines during exercises.
Conclusion
The U.S. Navy is the largest navy in the world, and on paper, certainly the most powerful. Of that there is no doubt. With the Russian Navy all but gone, the American navy remains the dominant sea power in the world. Yet, as we have seen here, this heavyweight navy often has great difficulty handling the little guys. Indeed, if the U.S. Navy were a boxer, one might say that his dominance is due mostly to his sheer size because he punches well below his massive weight. In this era of asymmetrical warfare, of David versus Goliath conflicts, perhaps it is time for America to rethink its naval strategy, lose some weight, and as sports announcers say, focus more on the fundamentals.
For all the money America spends on its huge navy, it really needs to be much better."
I don't expect you all to agree with this, but there are at least examples given regarding the capacity to sink carriers.
P
As to movement of forces my personal preference is a 'plot', just like a CINC, but with the actual fleet (the models) laid out on a table at closer to a realistic figure/table scale. This allows formations to be clearly set and even allows for the zig zag of escorts. I admit it works best with an umpire and 2 rooms. The main reasons this works is that it is a closer simulation to the working environment of the admiral of a fleet as well as making it easier to properly calculate defences against incoming missiles (as you know the approach vector and therefore which escorts it will pass when).
As to the 'safety' of a carrier in Harpoon... I offer the following from Roger Thompson, Professor of Military Studies at Knightsbridge University and a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. (I know he's a sociologist, but works in the defence field as is mainly critical of training and motivation in the USN... take that on board as you read)
"In 1981, The NATO exercise Ocean Venture ended with much embarrassment for the U.S. Navy, and more specifically, its enormously expensive aircraft carrier battle groups.
During the exercise, a Canadian submarine slipped quietly through a carrier's destroyer screen, and conducted a devastating simulated torpedo attack on the ship. The submarine was never detected, and when the exercise umpire, a U.S. Navy officer, pronounced the carrier dead, his official report was promptly stamped classified to minimize the potential fallout. Unfortunately, a Canadian submariner leaked the story to a local newspaper, and indicated that this successful Canadian attack on an American supercarrier was by no means an isolated incident. This news caused quite a stir in Congress, and the U.S. Navy had a lot of explaining to do. Why indeed had a small, 1960s-vintage diesel submarine of the under-funded Canadian Navy been able to defeat one of America s most powerful and expensive warships, and with such apparent ease?
There are several possible answers. Firstly, Canadian submariners are extremely well trained and professional. Secondly, at that time, the Oberon submarines used by the Canadian Navy were probably the quietest in the world. A third possible reason, not so commonly stated, and with all due respect, is that the mighty U.S. Navy is simply overrated. It is my humble contention that the U.S. Navy is not all it's cracked up to be, and that is the focus of the present article.
Diesel Subs Feast on U.S. Carriers
While Canadian submarines have routinely taken on U.S. Navy carriers, other small navies have enjoyed similar victories. The Royal Netherlands Navy, with its small force of extremely quiet diesel submarines, has made the U.S. Navy eat the proverbial slice of humble pie on more than one occasion. In 1989, naval ** CENSORED ** Norman Polmar wrote in Naval Forces that during NATO s exercise Northern Star, the Dutch submarine Zwaardvis was the only orange (enemy) submarine to successfully stalk and sink a blue (allied) aircraft carrier Ten years later there were reports that the Dutch submarine Walrus had been even more successful in the exercise JTFEX/TMDI99.
During this exercise the Walrus penetrates the U.S. screen and sinks many ships, including the U.S. aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt CVN-71. The submarine launches two attacks and manages to sneak away. To celebrate the sinking the crew designed a special T-shirt. Fittingly, the T-shirt depicted the USS Theodore Roosevelt impaled on the tusks of a walrus. It was also reported that the Walrus also sank many of the Roosevelt's escorts, including the nuclear submarine USS Boise, a cruiser, several destroyers and frigates, plus the command ship USS Mount Whitney. The Walrus herself survived the exercise with no damage.
Not to be outdone by the Canadians and Dutch, the Australian submarine force has also scored many goals against U.S. Navy carriers and nuclear submarines. On September 24 2003, the Australian newspaper The Age disclosed that Australia's Collins class diesel submarines had taught the U.S. Navy a few lessons during multinational exercises. By the end of the exercises, Australian submarines had destroyed two U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and an aircraft carrier. According to the article: The Americans were wide-eyed, Commodore Deeks (Commander of the RAN Submarine Group) said. They realized that another navy knows how to operate submarines
They went away very impressed.
Not surprisingly, NATO and allied submariners are extremely confident in their ability to sink American carriers. In his book The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine, Andrew Cockburn wryly noted that European submariners on NATO exercises were far more concerned about colliding with noisy American nuclear submarines (running fast and therefore, blind) than about being attacked by American ships.
The Russians mug the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk
These examples provide ample evidence of the vulnerability of U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to attacks from diesel submarines, but of course there are other ways to sink a carrier, as the Russian Air Force knows well. In October 2000, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk was mugged by Russian SU-24 and Su-27 aircraft, which were not detected until they were virtually on top of the carrier. The Russian aircraft buzzed the carrier s flight deck and caught the ship completely unprepared. To add insult to injury, the Russians took very detailed photos of the Kitty Hawk s flight deck, and very courteously, provided the pictures to the American CO via e-mail. In the December 7, 2000 edition of WorldNetDaily, Jon E. Dougherty said that the Russian photographs made it clear that there was panic aboard the Kitty Hawk. As one U.S. sailor quipped, The entire crew watched overhead as the Russians made a mockery of our feeble attempt of intercepting them.
Russia's air force is now only a faint shadow of what it once was, but even now, they can demonstrate that they can, if necessary, do significant damage to the U.S. Navy. It's little wonder then that a Russian newspaper gloated that If these had been planes on a war mission, the aircraft carrier would definitely have been sunk. Perhaps they are right. But it s not just the Russians, Canadians, Dutch and Australians who think the U.S. Navy s carrier battle groups are over-rated, expensive and extremely vulnerable. Admiral Hyman Rickover himself didn t think much of the American carrier-centered Navy, either. When asked in 1982 about how long the American carriers would survive in an actual war, he curtly replied that they would be finished in approximately 48 hours.
This isn't Top Gun
As we ve seen, U.S. carriers are remarkably vulnerable to attacks by submarines and aircraft, but what about the much-vaunted American naval aviators? How would the U.S.N. pilots fare in a dogfight with a well-trained enemy? The evidence is not encouraging. Canadian pilots routinely outperform U.S.N. aircrews in exercises, and have done so for many years. During the days of RCN carrier aviation it was well known that H.M.C.S. Bonaventure could put more planes in the air than much larger U.S.N. carriers. In the early 1980s it was revealed that the average pilot in the Canadian Air Force flew about 300 hours a year, whereas his U.S. Navy counterpart flew only about 160 hours annually. Even in this day of advanced flight simulators, there is still no substitute for the real thing (flying).
U.S. Naval aviators pride themselves as being supposedly far better than any Air Force pilots, but one merely has to look at the Canadian, Israeli and Chilean air forces to cast doubt on that assumption. The Israeli Air Force has bested the pride of the U.S. Navy, and they have done so even with less capable aircraft. A joint U.S.N.-I.A.F. air combat exercise in 2000 underlines and highlights the thesis that the U.S. Navy is overrated. On September 14, 2000, The Jerusalem Post announced that the Israelis soundly dispatched the air wing from the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (which, incidentally, was the same carrier the Dutch destroyed in 1999). Israeli F-16s squared off against American F-14s and F-18s, both of which are said to be more capable than the F-16. The final results were astonishing. The Israelis shot down a whopping 220 U.S. aircraft while losing only 20 themselves. The 10:1 kill ratio was so embarrassing that the results were not officially published to save the reputations of the U.S. Navy pilots.
Chile is certainly not a great military power, but its air force is well trained, and they too have given the U.S. Navy reason for pause. In the late 1980s, it was reported that Chilean Air Force pilots, flying the relatively unsophisticated but nimble F-5, had trounced an American carrier air group in air combat exercises. Like the Israelis, the kill ratio was 10:1 in favor of the Chileans. As usual, this incident did not receive much press coverage in the United States.
Lack of Training
Despite its vastly superior numbers, resources and weapons, the U.S. Navy, the world's only true heavyweight navy, continually fails to vanquish welterweight and lightweight naval powers. This would indicate that training, not big, expensive ships, is the key to naval power. It is training, or lack thereof, that truly undermines the performance of the U.S. Navy.
... Through his many best-selling books and movies, author Tom Clancy has created a crisp, sharp, spit-polished, efficient, and patriotic image for the U.S. Navy. Some think he should be a paid Public Relations consultant or recruiter for the U.S. submarine force. It may come as a shock to some of his readers, however, that the American sailors in his books are too good to be true, and that even some American submariners admit their training is not very good. Several recent books have effectively stripped off much of the shiny Hollywood polish on the American submarine force, most notably Petty Officer Andrew Karam s account of life on the USS Plunger, Rig Ship for Ultra Quiet (2002), and Douglas C. Waller s Big Red (2001). Both authors (Karam served on the submarine USS Plunger) said that there is a lot of hype regarding U.S. submarine training, but the reality is much less impressive. As for the legendary assertion that all U.S. submariners are experts on every system in their boats, one sailor told Waller that was All bunk. Waller explained that The (submariner s) qualification only made you familiar with the rest of the boat. It didn t mean you could actually run other parts. If (the sailor) and the other missile techs suddenly died, those nukes in the back wouldn't have a clue how to fire these rockets. Petty Officer Karam, an Engineering Laboratory Technician, concurred, and acknowledged that he could only work on other systems in a pinch . He continued The Plunger, and, for that matter, any nuke boat, was sufficiently complex that one person simply could not learn everything to that level of detail in the 14 months we were given to qualify. Not if they were doing their own jobs, too.
British allies, of course, have long ridiculed American submariners for spending too much time and effort learning about nuclear reactors. Surprisingly, Waller wrote that some U.S. Navy officers quietly agree. The Drill Coordinator on the USS Nebraska, Lieutenant Brent Kinman, told Waller that American submariners talk too much about the reactor, like mechanics, and not enough about how to fight the ship effectively: That was the problem with today s submariners, Kinman thought. They were technicians rather than warriors. The average lieutenant riding these boats considered himself a nuclear engineer first and a submarine officer second. It almost feels like we re out there just driving the reactor around This overemphasis on engineering might explain why diesel submarines are so often triumphant against U.S.N. nuclear submarines during exercises.
Conclusion
The U.S. Navy is the largest navy in the world, and on paper, certainly the most powerful. Of that there is no doubt. With the Russian Navy all but gone, the American navy remains the dominant sea power in the world. Yet, as we have seen here, this heavyweight navy often has great difficulty handling the little guys. Indeed, if the U.S. Navy were a boxer, one might say that his dominance is due mostly to his sheer size because he punches well below his massive weight. In this era of asymmetrical warfare, of David versus Goliath conflicts, perhaps it is time for America to rethink its naval strategy, lose some weight, and as sports announcers say, focus more on the fundamentals.
For all the money America spends on its huge navy, it really needs to be much better."
I don't expect you all to agree with this, but there are at least examples given regarding the capacity to sink carriers.
P
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av8rmongo
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- Joined: Sat Dec 11, 2004 8:24 pm
- Location: Newport, RI
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Let me offer some perspective on what Piersyf has said but let me first say I respect everyone's opinion I just respectfully disagree with the one offered here. Furthermore let me say that its not clear to me if the opinions expressed are Piersyf's or the authors that he quotes so I will just refer to them as "the opinions" without attribution.
1. Nobody actually involved with carrier aviation believes aircraft carriers are invulnerable. Its a myth, probably started by the Air Force during the debates over USS United States and the B-36.
2. No aircraft carrier has been sunk in combat by anything much less a submarine since the end of WWII. The Pakistanis couldn't do it in '71and the Argentinians couldn't do it in '82. There may be other wars I'm overlooking.
3. The examples that are cited are all from wargames/exercises. A couple things about exercises especially multi-national exercises:
a) It costs time and money to participate so everyone wants to get something out of it - the Return on Investment (ROI). So we have "The Script", the geography is constrained, the timeline is constrained and often the Rules of Engagement are constrained.
b) Even "Free Play" scenarios do not really replicate the real world due to many of the same constarints as the scripted scenarios.
c) In exercises it can be just as important to figure out what doesn't work as it is to find out what does work. Many of the exercise serials are established to test new ideas or equipment. Failure is neither emabarrasing nor particularly alarming, its all part of R&D.
d) Bottom line is that all exercises have a context and to take the results of an exercise and offer it up as proof of reality without also explaining that context is misleading at best.
Specifics:
on such a small deck. The bit about the flight hours I don't buy without knowing how this is measured. A notional deployment cycle would have been approximately six months of work-ups, six months of deployment followed by six months of relative standdown. On deployment I don't think I ever had a month where I didn't log at least 30 hours a month and hitting 50 hours was not unheard of. after returning from deployment I have several months with fewer than 20 hours but even so would not have dropped as low as 160 hours for the year.
1. Nobody actually involved with carrier aviation believes aircraft carriers are invulnerable. Its a myth, probably started by the Air Force during the debates over USS United States and the B-36.
2. No aircraft carrier has been sunk in combat by anything much less a submarine since the end of WWII. The Pakistanis couldn't do it in '71and the Argentinians couldn't do it in '82. There may be other wars I'm overlooking.
3. The examples that are cited are all from wargames/exercises. A couple things about exercises especially multi-national exercises:
a) It costs time and money to participate so everyone wants to get something out of it - the Return on Investment (ROI). So we have "The Script", the geography is constrained, the timeline is constrained and often the Rules of Engagement are constrained.
b) Even "Free Play" scenarios do not really replicate the real world due to many of the same constarints as the scripted scenarios.
c) In exercises it can be just as important to figure out what doesn't work as it is to find out what does work. Many of the exercise serials are established to test new ideas or equipment. Failure is neither emabarrasing nor particularly alarming, its all part of R&D.
d) Bottom line is that all exercises have a context and to take the results of an exercise and offer it up as proof of reality without also explaining that context is misleading at best.
Specifics:
I'm still fact checking this one but I think it is possible that this event occured during an experiment with operating a CV or CVN from inside a Norwegian Fjord. While sequestering a carrier inside a fjord has some advantages it does have some very obvious drawback namely predictability. I will have more to say on this one when I can pin it down better - when I know the full context."In 1981, The NATO exercise Ocean Venture ended with much embarrassment for the U.S. Navy, and more specifically, its enormously expensive aircraft carrier battle groups.
During the exercise, a Canadian submarine slipped quietly through a carrier's destroyer screen, and conducted a devastating simulated torpedo attack on the ship.
Again, need the context for these "kills". What was the geography? Was it real or synthetic geography? How long did the blue forces have for pre-search before the carrier arrived? What were the rules regarding active sonar use - were there marine mammal sanctuaries involved etc.? What was the waterspace management scheme at the time? All of this is important in understanding exactly what transpired.Diesel Subs Feast on U.S. Carriers
While Canadian submarines have routinely taken on U.S. Navy carriers, other small navies have enjoyed similar victories. The Royal Netherlands Navy, with its small force of extremely quiet diesel submarines, has made the U.S. Navy eat the proverbial slice of humble pie on more than one occasion. In 1989, naval ** CENSORED ** Norman Polmar wrote in Naval Forces that during NATO s exercise Northern Star, the Dutch submarine Zwaardvis was the only orange (enemy) submarine to successfully stalk and sink a blue (allied) aircraft carrier Ten years later there were reports that the Dutch submarine Walrus had been even more successful in the exercise JTFEX/TMDI99.
True story, people make mistakes. I have a very similar photo of the fantail of HMS Invincible as I zorched by catching them totally unaware. It happens. In peacetime COs get relieved and everyone learns something (not sure in Invincible's case actually). In peacetime there's little reason to think something like this will happen but in war there is every reason to believe it could happen and the crews vigilance would naturally be heightened.The Russians mug the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk
These examples provide ample evidence of the vulnerability of U.S. Navy carrier battle groups to attacks from diesel submarines, but of course there are other ways to sink a carrier, as the Russian Air Force knows well. In October 2000, the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kitty Hawk was mugged by Russian SU-24 and Su-27 aircraft, which were not detected until they were virtually on top of the carrier. The Russian aircraft buzzed the carrier s flight deck and caught the ship completely unprepared. To add insult to injury, the Russians took very detailed photos of the Kitty Hawk s flight deck
Interesting historiographical note here: On January 31st 1982 Admiral Rickover was forced to retire from the navy after 63yrs by then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman - a naval aviator. How much of his sentiment is based on professional evaluation and how much is personal or emotional? Rickover also always believed that carriers were too important to be trusted to aviators, they should be operated by his nuclear trained officers, more on that later.Admiral Hyman Rickover himself didn t think much of the American carrier-centered Navy, either. When asked in 1982 about how long the American carriers would survive in an actual war, he curtly replied that they would be finished in approximately 48 hours.
This is an interesting one HMCS Bonaventure a former RN "Light Fleet" carrier had an excellent reputation - a well earned undisputed reputation. A US Navy pilot I know, an "Old Timer" talked about the cross deck flying opportunity he had. The deck is much narrower than what he was used to and he was impressed with their ability to operateCanadian pilots routinely outperform U.S.N. aircrews in exercises, and have done so for many years. During the days of RCN carrier aviation it was well known that H.M.C.S. Bonaventure could put more planes in the air than much larger U.S.N. carriers. In the early 1980s it was revealed that the average pilot in the Canadian Air Force flew about 300 hours a year, whereas his U.S. Navy counterpart flew only about 160 hours annually. Even in this day of advanced flight simulators, there is still no substitute for the real thing (flying).
on such a small deck. The bit about the flight hours I don't buy without knowing how this is measured. A notional deployment cycle would have been approximately six months of work-ups, six months of deployment followed by six months of relative standdown. On deployment I don't think I ever had a month where I didn't log at least 30 hours a month and hitting 50 hours was not unheard of. after returning from deployment I have several months with fewer than 20 hours but even so would not have dropped as low as 160 hours for the year.
A joint U.S.N.-I.A.F. air combat exercise in 2000 underlines and highlights the thesis that the U.S. Navy is overrated. On September 14, 2000, The Jerusalem Post announced that the Israelis soundly dispatched the air wing from the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (which, incidentally, was the same carrier the Dutch destroyed in 1999). Israeli F-16s squared off against American F-14s and F-18s, both of which are said to be more capable than the F-16. The final results were astonishing. The Israelis shot down a whopping 220 U.S. aircraft while losing only 20 themselves. The 10:1 kill ratio was so embarrassing that the results were not officially published to save the reputations of the U.S. Navy pilots.[/i]
This is where the context is critical. There are times when neither side wants to give too much away to the other or maybe a third party that may be watching. I'm betting there were no provisions made for Beyond Visual Range (BVR) engagements, an area where the USN pilots would have a distinct advantage in 2000. F-14 and F-18 are more capable that F-16s in may areas but not in a dogfight. The F-14 is a monster designed as an interceptor not a dogfighter and depending on the variant could be at a severe handicap. The F-18 is much closer in capability but suffers a weight penalty in the structural strengthening required to survive carrier launches and recoveries. Don't think that is significant? Just take a look at the landing gear of the two aircraft side by side and that is just one area. It can be as much as 10-15% or the aircrafts basic weight. What restrictions might have been placed on the exercise to prevent regional enemies from learning valuable intelligence? Who knows but knowing would shed some light on the how things happened the way they did.
Here's one where I can be pretty sure that BVR rules were not used since the F-5 has no capability in that regime. Okay if there was no BVR then what about medium range missile shots. Without knowing this its hard to judge just how well the exercise played out. In the dogfight realm the F-5 is small and nimble, which is why it is used at Top Gun as an adversary. The weight issue mentioned above is also a factor between the F-14/F-18 of the USN and the F-5 of the Chilean AF. Good on them if it was a straight up fight but I doubt it.Chile is certainly not a great military power, but its air force is well trained, and they too have given the U.S. Navy reason for pause. In the late 1980s, it was reported that Chilean Air Force pilots, flying the relatively unsophisticated but nimble F-5, had trounced an American carrier air group in air combat exercises. Like the Israelis, the kill ratio was 10:1 in favor of the Chileans. As usual, this incident did not receive much press coverage in the United States.
What? What naval power has the US Navy failed to vanquish... Oh the exercise world not the real world. Well I suggest we ask the Libyan Navy or the Iranian Navy of the 80's if they felt vanquished.Despite its vastly superior numbers, resources and weapons, the U.S. Navy, the world's only true heavyweight navy, continually fails to vanquish welterweight and lightweight naval powers.
Well it may come as a shock but Tom Clancy is in the business of selling books.... Through his many best-selling books and movies, author Tom Clancy has created a crisp, sharp, spit-polished, efficient, and patriotic image for the U.S. Navy. Some think he should be a paid Public Relations consultant or recruiter for the U.S. submarine force. It may come as a shock to some of his readers, however, that the American sailors in his books are too good to be true
Well there may be some truth here. And it is directly attributable to Admiral Rickover.That was the problem with today s submariners, Kinman thought. They were technicians rather than warriors. The average lieutenant riding these boats considered himself a nuclear engineer first and a submarine officer second. It almost feels like we re out there just driving the reactor around
I hope I've shown here that its not all as grim as this would try to make you believe. At least not without knowing more of the facts of each case.Conclusion
The U.S. Navy is the largest navy in the world, and on paper, certainly the most powerful. Of that there is no doubt. With the Russian Navy all but gone, the American navy remains the dominant sea power in the world. Yet, as we have seen here, this heavyweight navy often has great difficulty handling the little guys.
Does the US Navy have blinders on? Maybe.
Are the carriers vulnerable? Of course they are, anything that floats can sink but in a stand up fight I wouldn't want to be anywhere else. (sorry for wrapping myself in the flag there a little bit)
Paul
“It's a beautiful thing, the destruction of words.â€
― George Orwell, 1984
People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.
- George Orwell
http://av8rmongo.wordpress.com
― George Orwell, 1984
People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf.
- George Orwell
http://av8rmongo.wordpress.com
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piersyf
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I'm glad you replied av8rmongo... and if it makes a difference the opinions are the authors, but I believe there is an element of truth to them (as I think you do).
My own personal awareness of that reported was the Australian context... the Collins class subs (which we think are noisy, but after a fleet of Oberons, almost anything would be) have engaged US carrier assets successfully in wargames as I'm sure you're aware (I notice you didn't quote on the Australian actions in my post). I can say that as far as I'm aware those games took place around the Islands of Hawaii, so yes, coastal and with quite a few marine parks I'm sure.
Nevertheless, the reason I posted that was in response to a comment that carriers cannot be sunk in Harpoon (the game) and so I gave examples of cases where carriers were sunk (albeit in other 'games'). The point being that wargame rules, especially naval rules, focus entirely on the technical capabilities of the ships and weapons, not so much on the capabilities of the crews to fight those ships. As I stated in the post, the author is a sociologist and is primarily concerned with the capabilities of crews.
I'd be interested to see what you turn up on the incidents described. I'm not navy, I'm ex army, and I agree with your comments that exercises don't necessarily represent the real world... I've been put in some pretty compromised positions on exercises (we managed to win one of them though, even outnumbered 5 to one), but exercises are meant to be practicing for the real thing... testing the 'what if's'. And you do learn more from the failures than the successes.
There's nothing wrong with wrapping yourself in the flag, just so long as it isn't wrapped around your head, blinding you to what is possible.
P
My own personal awareness of that reported was the Australian context... the Collins class subs (which we think are noisy, but after a fleet of Oberons, almost anything would be) have engaged US carrier assets successfully in wargames as I'm sure you're aware (I notice you didn't quote on the Australian actions in my post). I can say that as far as I'm aware those games took place around the Islands of Hawaii, so yes, coastal and with quite a few marine parks I'm sure.
Nevertheless, the reason I posted that was in response to a comment that carriers cannot be sunk in Harpoon (the game) and so I gave examples of cases where carriers were sunk (albeit in other 'games'). The point being that wargame rules, especially naval rules, focus entirely on the technical capabilities of the ships and weapons, not so much on the capabilities of the crews to fight those ships. As I stated in the post, the author is a sociologist and is primarily concerned with the capabilities of crews.
I'd be interested to see what you turn up on the incidents described. I'm not navy, I'm ex army, and I agree with your comments that exercises don't necessarily represent the real world... I've been put in some pretty compromised positions on exercises (we managed to win one of them though, even outnumbered 5 to one), but exercises are meant to be practicing for the real thing... testing the 'what if's'. And you do learn more from the failures than the successes.
There's nothing wrong with wrapping yourself in the flag, just so long as it isn't wrapped around your head, blinding you to what is possible.
P
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exodusforever
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Both are very interesting points on naval warfare tactics.
Now since I posted way back on the advantage of a submarine attack on a Carrier.
Would you say in deepwaters (ocean) conditions, a diesel sub would have an advantage in slipping past the CBG screen? For practical purposes, lets assume both sides are aware that they are in a wartime situation with potential threats on both side.
What possibility or chance would a diesel sub have against them?
I guess at this point, a certain amount of imagination and facts would be required
Now since I posted way back on the advantage of a submarine attack on a Carrier.
Would you say in deepwaters (ocean) conditions, a diesel sub would have an advantage in slipping past the CBG screen? For practical purposes, lets assume both sides are aware that they are in a wartime situation with potential threats on both side.
What possibility or chance would a diesel sub have against them?
I guess at this point, a certain amount of imagination and facts would be required
IG: modernwargame
"The best weapon against an enemy is another enemy."
-Friedrich Nietzsche
"The best weapon against an enemy is another enemy."
-Friedrich Nietzsche
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piersyf
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Remember that I'm not Navy! So this is an opinion based on reading only...
I will start with the usual caveat/cop-out and say it depends... on the particular boat, the circumstances and the crew.
If we ignore crew and just go with technical capabilities I would say that it is possible for a diesel sub to engage a CBG in deep water, but it sure aint easy!
1) escorts are more free to be active with sonar. Sound absorbent skins on subs are good, but still detectable. This would make a close approach very risky (and by close I mean within 10, maybe even 20 miles)as sonar looks a lot further these days than it did in WW2, and even a random return can put a question in the sonarman's mind and get an overflight by a MADbird (non detectable by the sub) or dipping sonar from helos to check it out.
2) even if you do get close, diesel subs run on batteries underwater so they have a limited attack window before they run out of juice, and a CBG will not be moving slowly in blue water, especially if they have reason to suspect the presence of subs. Speed is a very good first line of defence against subs and torpedoes as it chronically effects firing options/solutions
3) this kinda predicates a long range response... long range wireguided and self terminal homing torps (wire half way, torp sonar goes active then self tracks the last leg) or better still tube launched harpoons. Diesel subs certainly have the capacity to track the surface vessels in a passive mode, but whether they can do that well enough at a long enough range to give target data to the harpoon depends on crew and equipment.
Australia's Collins Class boats have a blue water capability, but they are easily more at home in coastal waters. In other words, they travel to the bad guy's home waters and hunt there. Given the region we operate in and the thousands of islands north of us all the way through Asia, it's not a bad boat. At least now that we stopped them leaking. And we do use tube launched harpoons as well as the new heavy Mk48.
If your question specifically is asking for a comparison between a nuke sub and a diesel I'd say that the diesel has advantages in being quieter than a nuke and being much smaller (reduced sonar cross section), but the nuke has the endurance and speed.
BTW, one Larry Bond type scenario I read had a diesel sub engage with all forward tubes using homing torps, two at the two nearest escorts/ASW ships, and the rest at the main prize, hoping that the escorts would be too busy evading to stop the sub escaping. May be possible, don't know.
P
I will start with the usual caveat/cop-out and say it depends... on the particular boat, the circumstances and the crew.
If we ignore crew and just go with technical capabilities I would say that it is possible for a diesel sub to engage a CBG in deep water, but it sure aint easy!
1) escorts are more free to be active with sonar. Sound absorbent skins on subs are good, but still detectable. This would make a close approach very risky (and by close I mean within 10, maybe even 20 miles)as sonar looks a lot further these days than it did in WW2, and even a random return can put a question in the sonarman's mind and get an overflight by a MADbird (non detectable by the sub) or dipping sonar from helos to check it out.
2) even if you do get close, diesel subs run on batteries underwater so they have a limited attack window before they run out of juice, and a CBG will not be moving slowly in blue water, especially if they have reason to suspect the presence of subs. Speed is a very good first line of defence against subs and torpedoes as it chronically effects firing options/solutions
3) this kinda predicates a long range response... long range wireguided and self terminal homing torps (wire half way, torp sonar goes active then self tracks the last leg) or better still tube launched harpoons. Diesel subs certainly have the capacity to track the surface vessels in a passive mode, but whether they can do that well enough at a long enough range to give target data to the harpoon depends on crew and equipment.
Australia's Collins Class boats have a blue water capability, but they are easily more at home in coastal waters. In other words, they travel to the bad guy's home waters and hunt there. Given the region we operate in and the thousands of islands north of us all the way through Asia, it's not a bad boat. At least now that we stopped them leaking. And we do use tube launched harpoons as well as the new heavy Mk48.
If your question specifically is asking for a comparison between a nuke sub and a diesel I'd say that the diesel has advantages in being quieter than a nuke and being much smaller (reduced sonar cross section), but the nuke has the endurance and speed.
BTW, one Larry Bond type scenario I read had a diesel sub engage with all forward tubes using homing torps, two at the two nearest escorts/ASW ships, and the rest at the main prize, hoping that the escorts would be too busy evading to stop the sub escaping. May be possible, don't know.
P
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TAMMY
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I want to add something about modern non-nuclears submarines, The new Italian boats (2 subs class U212A, a joint project with Germany which built 4 boats)) are only diesel boats but have fuel cells (A.I.P.) increasing the submerged range. The hydrogen and oxygen for fuel cells are in tanks placed in the double hull. Acrually the front part of the sub is a single hull and only the rear part is double.
The boat has a very low acoustic and magnetc signature.
According to Italian press, the first sub "Todaro" took part in an exercise with USN in the Atlantic in September 2008 where it "torpedoed" an aircraft carrier. I have no detail of the exercise but I suppose it was in open water. The Atlantic is not the usual area of operation for Italian submerine, they normally operate in the Medierranean.
In other exercises they were used as "friends" and were able to follow for a certain time nuclear subs without being detected
According the same source, these subs are now often used in "secret" surveillance and information collection tracking merchant ships suspeted of traffic weapons. This is done as part of an international US program to reduce this type of traffic.
The boat has a very low acoustic and magnetc signature.
According to Italian press, the first sub "Todaro" took part in an exercise with USN in the Atlantic in September 2008 where it "torpedoed" an aircraft carrier. I have no detail of the exercise but I suppose it was in open water. The Atlantic is not the usual area of operation for Italian submerine, they normally operate in the Medierranean.
In other exercises they were used as "friends" and were able to follow for a certain time nuclear subs without being detected
According the same source, these subs are now often used in "secret" surveillance and information collection tracking merchant ships suspeted of traffic weapons. This is done as part of an international US program to reduce this type of traffic.
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Mickel
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That's the catch with all the exercises... they're clouded in secrecy. So what's in the press is only half the story. The 'boring' important stuff is left out or classified.
Diesel boats have to pay for the fact they're quiet - they're slow. In coastal waters, all good. In the open ocean, not so much. Nucs might not be the quietest, but they can run at 30kts down deep all day if they have to (and the environment allows). And at sea, speed can be life as much as it is in the air. I've seen PBEM games where the guy who got the fastest the firstest had it all over the guy who stuck with slow and steady.
Never been convinced about sub launched missiles against a defended target. Never enough available to swamp the defences, and it could be a bit of a give away to your location.
I guess it depends on your definition of a 'tactical' engagement. I see it over a much greater distance than you're average land gamer, who might be thinking 5 square miles. As voltiguer points out, it's more like 950 square miles at sea.
Of course, we're mostly ham fisted amateurs! I was talking to a guy who was on a P-3 once. Starting talking in some detail. Was asked we knew a bit about all this. I replied that we knew enough to know we don't know much.
Mike
Diesel boats have to pay for the fact they're quiet - they're slow. In coastal waters, all good. In the open ocean, not so much. Nucs might not be the quietest, but they can run at 30kts down deep all day if they have to (and the environment allows). And at sea, speed can be life as much as it is in the air. I've seen PBEM games where the guy who got the fastest the firstest had it all over the guy who stuck with slow and steady.
Never been convinced about sub launched missiles against a defended target. Never enough available to swamp the defences, and it could be a bit of a give away to your location.
I guess it depends on your definition of a 'tactical' engagement. I see it over a much greater distance than you're average land gamer, who might be thinking 5 square miles. As voltiguer points out, it's more like 950 square miles at sea.
Of course, we're mostly ham fisted amateurs! I was talking to a guy who was on a P-3 once. Starting talking in some detail. Was asked we knew a bit about all this. I replied that we knew enough to know we don't know much.
Mike
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piersyf
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Absolutely agree with you Mickel, diesels have to be in the right place at the right time to get an attack window. Heck, that even applied in WW2 against warships in blue water! Also agree with the position that a sub won't have enough tube launched missiles to swamp a CTG defences. It would more likely take a wolf pack approach, and even then, combined with air assets. Something NATO worked on in the 70's and 80's. Really, that sort of thing comes down to the level of training/preparedness of the crew and the state of repair of the equipment.
There is a possibility of taking down an escort vessel and running down the ASW stores in the task force while they look for you, but that also is a very uncertain game. You need support for secondary attacks, and also ways to stop resupply. It an be effective, though. Stores are not unlimited on warships, even on carriers. Make em use em, and you change the tactical calculations.
There is a possibility of taking down an escort vessel and running down the ASW stores in the task force while they look for you, but that also is a very uncertain game. You need support for secondary attacks, and also ways to stop resupply. It an be effective, though. Stores are not unlimited on warships, even on carriers. Make em use em, and you change the tactical calculations.
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TAMMY
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Generally speakung I agree that exercises are set in specific conditions. But in this case I imagine that one of the reason was to test the possible actions of a new boat with fuel cellls.
The speed of nuclear subs is an advantage in strategic movement but in the attack th speed will be slow to reduce noise. This means that the sub may easily repeat attacks attempts in diffrente places.
For a diesl boat this is more limited but he U212A is credited with 20 knots submerged, not exactly slow and I suppose that a Task Force will not always moves at 30 knots.
I add that when II wrote "torpedoed" I meant exactly this as Italy has no submarine launched missiles. After all if you can pass below the escort ring, the result is the same
In any case I think that the differences between an exercise and the real life will be mainly in two areas.
1) The set piece situation with all the relevant advantages and disadvantages. The crews involved may be more or less trained but they are surely on the alert.
2) What happens after the attack. It is part of the exercise? I may imagine that a boat with a very very low acoustic and magnetic signature may succeed in avoiding passive detection and arrive to launch diatance. But when the first torpedo is detected the ships will change to active means to detect the intriuder and its possibilities to escape from the middle of the formation will be near to zero, except in particular circunstances. I am not so sure that in real life to trade its sub for an aircraft carrier will be an easy choice for the sub commander.
The speed of nuclear subs is an advantage in strategic movement but in the attack th speed will be slow to reduce noise. This means that the sub may easily repeat attacks attempts in diffrente places.
For a diesl boat this is more limited but he U212A is credited with 20 knots submerged, not exactly slow and I suppose that a Task Force will not always moves at 30 knots.
I add that when II wrote "torpedoed" I meant exactly this as Italy has no submarine launched missiles. After all if you can pass below the escort ring, the result is the same
In any case I think that the differences between an exercise and the real life will be mainly in two areas.
1) The set piece situation with all the relevant advantages and disadvantages. The crews involved may be more or less trained but they are surely on the alert.
2) What happens after the attack. It is part of the exercise? I may imagine that a boat with a very very low acoustic and magnetic signature may succeed in avoiding passive detection and arrive to launch diatance. But when the first torpedo is detected the ships will change to active means to detect the intriuder and its possibilities to escape from the middle of the formation will be near to zero, except in particular circunstances. I am not so sure that in real life to trade its sub for an aircraft carrier will be an easy choice for the sub commander.
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chrisswim
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[quote=" Nevertheless, the reason I posted that was in response to a comment that carriers cannot be sunk in Harpoon (the game) and so I gave examples of cases where carriers were sunk (albeit in other 'games'). The point being that wargame rules, especially naval rules, focus entirely on the technical capabilities of the ships and weapons, not so much on the capabilities of the crews to fight those ships. As I stated in the post, the author is a sociologist and is primarily concerned with the capabilities of crews.
P[/quote]
As we play a game, we as players are the surrogate crew members, so only the technical aspect of the system are determined by the rule set. So if you are 'good' enough, you will get through or lucky enough....
[quote=" I'd be interested to see what you turn up on the incidents described. I'm not navy, I'm ex army, and I agree with your comments that exercises don't necessarily represent the real world... I've been put in some pretty compromised positions on exercises (we managed to win one of them though, even outnumbered 5 to one), but exercises are meant to be practicing for the real thing... testing the 'what if's'. And you do learn more from the failures than the successes.P[/quote]
A practice senario can be many things, it may be to test a radar system, combat system, command, etc and certainly a combination of systems, i.e. test 'the' system. Glad you won. So when the other subs got through, we learned more, so we are better prepared.
[quote=" There's nothing wrong with wrapping yourself in the flag, just so long as it isn't wrapped around your head, blinding you to what is possible. P[/quote]
Could not agree more. Dont think AV8 is blind, his thoughts are well presented, and thought out.
P[/quote]
As we play a game, we as players are the surrogate crew members, so only the technical aspect of the system are determined by the rule set. So if you are 'good' enough, you will get through or lucky enough....
[quote=" I'd be interested to see what you turn up on the incidents described. I'm not navy, I'm ex army, and I agree with your comments that exercises don't necessarily represent the real world... I've been put in some pretty compromised positions on exercises (we managed to win one of them though, even outnumbered 5 to one), but exercises are meant to be practicing for the real thing... testing the 'what if's'. And you do learn more from the failures than the successes.P[/quote]
A practice senario can be many things, it may be to test a radar system, combat system, command, etc and certainly a combination of systems, i.e. test 'the' system. Glad you won. So when the other subs got through, we learned more, so we are better prepared.
[quote=" There's nothing wrong with wrapping yourself in the flag, just so long as it isn't wrapped around your head, blinding you to what is possible. P[/quote]
Could not agree more. Dont think AV8 is blind, his thoughts are well presented, and thought out.
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TAMMY
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I will spend a few words about the meanings of the result of an exerxise as distinct from a test.
The main scope of an exercise is to verify the tarining levele of crews and their ability to operate "the systems" as foreseen. This means that the threats from the "enemy" will be within the limits of the equipment without unexpected actions. It will have no meaning to insert actions for which the equipment and the manuals have no answers.
In a test the siatuation is different but is not free either. You test the correspondence of the new equipment to the design and that it performs as foreseen. Again no unforeseen threats that may be outside the design possibilities of the system.
Just to be clear, suppose you have a new radar system that (by absurd), have no zero level capabilities. Neither in exercise nor in test you will plan an attack at zero level because you already know the result.
"Free" exercises ("free" means that the "enemy" is totally free to act without restrictions of any kind) are very rare and, in any case, difficult to evaluate. The eventual negative resutlt is due to defective training, good knowledge of your limits by the "enemy" or simply luck.
The main scope of an exercise is to verify the tarining levele of crews and their ability to operate "the systems" as foreseen. This means that the threats from the "enemy" will be within the limits of the equipment without unexpected actions. It will have no meaning to insert actions for which the equipment and the manuals have no answers.
In a test the siatuation is different but is not free either. You test the correspondence of the new equipment to the design and that it performs as foreseen. Again no unforeseen threats that may be outside the design possibilities of the system.
Just to be clear, suppose you have a new radar system that (by absurd), have no zero level capabilities. Neither in exercise nor in test you will plan an attack at zero level because you already know the result.
"Free" exercises ("free" means that the "enemy" is totally free to act without restrictions of any kind) are very rare and, in any case, difficult to evaluate. The eventual negative resutlt is due to defective training, good knowledge of your limits by the "enemy" or simply luck.
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voltigeur
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All of this talk about these so called “victories†and “feasting†is really suspect. First off naval exercises are the most political training you can find. Not to mention that the navy classifies all things as much as possible. (I even had a naval officer from G2 tell me he wished they could classify Janes and Popular Electronics!)
If a serious threat to a carrier group is found it makes sense the navy would keep it under wraps till they had a chance to ** CENSORED ** it and develop tactics and SOP’s to deal with it.
The next point you have to consider is that now that America is perceived as the remaining super power the navy has been doing some pretty stupid things with the carriers. I remember being shocked that the Navy would put a carrier in the Persian Gulf. Do that during a military crisis with Iran and your playing right into the hands of the defender. If a carrier got sunk under those circumstances it would be no reflection of the Captain or his crew but the stupid arrogance of Washington brass many of which have never been to sea.
During the cold war carriers were kept well into blue water where a Diesel sub would have a hard time getting into a position to attack and where a Los Angeles (not transiting at high speed) is more in its element.
But get a carrier close to shore on top of continental shelves and you are playing the Diesel’s game. That is not the fault of Battle Group or the crews that have to obey orders putting themselves as such a disadvantage.
The other thing about exercises is that they are seriously soccer mommed. When I was in the Corps we kicked the crap out of the California National guard. I mean really put them in humiliating situations. After it was over they were told how great they performed and given some BS reason to be proud of their performance. Good for morale I just hoped that the Brass somewhere knew better.
The point is that even if the subs that Piesyf likes to cite did get successful torpedo runs on a carrier. If they had been picked up in a convergence zone or tracked by Sea Vikings on MAD they would have never been told. One for morale and the Navy would not want its true capabilities known.
If a serious threat to a carrier group is found it makes sense the navy would keep it under wraps till they had a chance to ** CENSORED ** it and develop tactics and SOP’s to deal with it.
The next point you have to consider is that now that America is perceived as the remaining super power the navy has been doing some pretty stupid things with the carriers. I remember being shocked that the Navy would put a carrier in the Persian Gulf. Do that during a military crisis with Iran and your playing right into the hands of the defender. If a carrier got sunk under those circumstances it would be no reflection of the Captain or his crew but the stupid arrogance of Washington brass many of which have never been to sea.
During the cold war carriers were kept well into blue water where a Diesel sub would have a hard time getting into a position to attack and where a Los Angeles (not transiting at high speed) is more in its element.
But get a carrier close to shore on top of continental shelves and you are playing the Diesel’s game. That is not the fault of Battle Group or the crews that have to obey orders putting themselves as such a disadvantage.
The other thing about exercises is that they are seriously soccer mommed. When I was in the Corps we kicked the crap out of the California National guard. I mean really put them in humiliating situations. After it was over they were told how great they performed and given some BS reason to be proud of their performance. Good for morale I just hoped that the Brass somewhere knew better.
The point is that even if the subs that Piesyf likes to cite did get successful torpedo runs on a carrier. If they had been picked up in a convergence zone or tracked by Sea Vikings on MAD they would have never been told. One for morale and the Navy would not want its true capabilities known.
I pray for Peace on Earth Good will toward men. Till then one round HE fire for Effect!
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TAMMY
- E5
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- Joined: Wed Jan 27, 2010 12:09 am
- Location: MILANO, ITALY
One of the big advanmtage of a carrier group is its mobility and the difficulty to locate it.
Obviusdly this advantage is denied in an exercise where the situation is set for the enemy attack. The scenario is set to allow for the attack of the diesel boat starting from an useful position.
Even If a diese boat succeed in damaging the aircrfat carrier, the resuil must be considered in the overalll picture. Possibly It has been carried out in a tactical situation that will never happens (at least with a bit of caution) and mey give an indication of what has to be avoided.
It is not strictly necessary to increase or modify the detection systems, it is enough to know the possible threat and the situations where it may materialize itlself. Or to know what to look for in terms of scoustic and magnetic signature.
In any case today we are not speaking of traditional diesel boat-
The last Italian submarines (U212A) are diesel-electric with an A.I.P. systems which allows a submerged range (without snorkeling) of 420 miles at 8 knots. With diesel electric I mean that the diesel angine is coupled to a generator not to the screw.There is a special electric motor with low rpm coupled with a well designed screw. The screw rotates at 120 rpm (which 1/2 to 1/4 of a normal diesel boat.
Add to this that the sub is credited with a max depth of 500 metres (specifica to the Italian boats; the Gerrman ones are designed for 300 metres), the hull is built of amagnetic steel and everything has been designe to reduce noise and magnetic sugnature. In order to increase the launching depth, the torpedoes are launched by hydraulic piston and not by compressed air as usual.
Obviusdly this advantage is denied in an exercise where the situation is set for the enemy attack. The scenario is set to allow for the attack of the diesel boat starting from an useful position.
Even If a diese boat succeed in damaging the aircrfat carrier, the resuil must be considered in the overalll picture. Possibly It has been carried out in a tactical situation that will never happens (at least with a bit of caution) and mey give an indication of what has to be avoided.
It is not strictly necessary to increase or modify the detection systems, it is enough to know the possible threat and the situations where it may materialize itlself. Or to know what to look for in terms of scoustic and magnetic signature.
In any case today we are not speaking of traditional diesel boat-
The last Italian submarines (U212A) are diesel-electric with an A.I.P. systems which allows a submerged range (without snorkeling) of 420 miles at 8 knots. With diesel electric I mean that the diesel angine is coupled to a generator not to the screw.There is a special electric motor with low rpm coupled with a well designed screw. The screw rotates at 120 rpm (which 1/2 to 1/4 of a normal diesel boat.
Add to this that the sub is credited with a max depth of 500 metres (specifica to the Italian boats; the Gerrman ones are designed for 300 metres), the hull is built of amagnetic steel and everything has been designe to reduce noise and magnetic sugnature. In order to increase the launching depth, the torpedoes are launched by hydraulic piston and not by compressed air as usual.
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exodusforever
- E5
- Posts: 141
- Joined: Tue Mar 03, 2009 1:21 am
- Location: Singapore
Since the new releases from GHQ are coming out soon,
I thought i make a stir here so that GHQ might add one or two modern naval units. (Fingers crossed)
In viewing all that has been said on the various scenarios for both proposition and opposition on the effectiveness and complacency of the USN.
I can come to a conclusion. I have to agree that military exercises like trade policies between country have political underlinings in it.
While on exercise, the Americans do not seem to perform well. It may possibly be just a forefront in ** CENSORED ** other navies without giving away too much of your battle strategies in this exercise.
While all that I have said is pure speculation.
One cannot doubt the Super Naval Power that is the USN. it has 11 Aircraft carriers and the Largest Economical Nation in the world is looking set to making new Gerald R Ford Class Super carriers to steer their navy into the future.
But lets just get a picture of how gigantic the US navy is. I read in a Jane's Defense Report that the presence of 1 Aircraft carrier in the Taiwanese Straits can boost Taiwanese Air Defense by 50%.
In fact, I think there are more Fighter aircraft in 1 single US Aircraft Carrier than there are in My small tiny island nation of Singapore. And in terms of air Superiority, Our nation in the South East Asian region is one of the cream of the crop.
To put things in simple terms, The USN can have rooms for error. Assuming by some chance, A diesel sub does get one Aircraft carrier due to the complacency of the battle group. The USN will not fall for such a tactic more than once and Even with one less Aircraaft Carrier. Don't you think The USN is still capable of taking on the entire EU Navy with its arsenal.
I guess that's my new question to reignite this thread.
JUST HOW exceedingly well based on inventory would a US Navy be against the entire EU. (WW3 scenario)
Another topic I want to add is the recent sinking of the South Korean Corvette. Speculation is that it got sunk by a North Korean Sub. What are your take on that? And Any speculative presumption on what that could lead to?
I thought i make a stir here so that GHQ might add one or two modern naval units. (Fingers crossed)
In viewing all that has been said on the various scenarios for both proposition and opposition on the effectiveness and complacency of the USN.
I can come to a conclusion. I have to agree that military exercises like trade policies between country have political underlinings in it.
While on exercise, the Americans do not seem to perform well. It may possibly be just a forefront in ** CENSORED ** other navies without giving away too much of your battle strategies in this exercise.
While all that I have said is pure speculation.
One cannot doubt the Super Naval Power that is the USN. it has 11 Aircraft carriers and the Largest Economical Nation in the world is looking set to making new Gerald R Ford Class Super carriers to steer their navy into the future.
But lets just get a picture of how gigantic the US navy is. I read in a Jane's Defense Report that the presence of 1 Aircraft carrier in the Taiwanese Straits can boost Taiwanese Air Defense by 50%.
In fact, I think there are more Fighter aircraft in 1 single US Aircraft Carrier than there are in My small tiny island nation of Singapore. And in terms of air Superiority, Our nation in the South East Asian region is one of the cream of the crop.
To put things in simple terms, The USN can have rooms for error. Assuming by some chance, A diesel sub does get one Aircraft carrier due to the complacency of the battle group. The USN will not fall for such a tactic more than once and Even with one less Aircraaft Carrier. Don't you think The USN is still capable of taking on the entire EU Navy with its arsenal.
I guess that's my new question to reignite this thread.
JUST HOW exceedingly well based on inventory would a US Navy be against the entire EU. (WW3 scenario)
Another topic I want to add is the recent sinking of the South Korean Corvette. Speculation is that it got sunk by a North Korean Sub. What are your take on that? And Any speculative presumption on what that could lead to?
IG: modernwargame
"The best weapon against an enemy is another enemy."
-Friedrich Nietzsche
"The best weapon against an enemy is another enemy."
-Friedrich Nietzsche